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ABSTRACT 
Communications in wartime are critical. The United States 
Marine Corps communicates well using a variety of radios, 
each for a specialized and limited purpose. However, the 
USMC could potentially benefit from the exploration of 
combining communication capabilities in a single device by 
leveraging commercial off-the-shelf software and expanding 
the existing network infrastructure. This thesis seeks to 
resolve this gap in capabilities by providing a fire support 
application prototype that serves as a proof-of-concept for 
rapidly developable applications that would have an 
immediate positive impact, providing enhanced warfighter 
capabilities. If successful, this application could be 
further developed and fielded, and thus improve warfighting 
capabilities and inform future efforts in an effort to 
accomplish improved network management and the efficient use 
of existing and future communication technologies. 
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On March 21, 2003, during the first days of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as a member of the 15th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), this researcher’s position was 
attacked by Iraqi paramilitary forces. The attack was 
against the MEU’s forward command post (CP) established at 
the Iraqi naval port in the southern Iraqi city of Umm Qasr. 
The attack came as the MEU’s ground combat power, the 
Battalion Landing Team (BLT), attacked north to secure their 
next objective. This BLT attack left the MEU command post at 
its most vulnerable—and the enemy paramilitary forces seized 
the opportunity.  
This Iraqi counter-attack was repelled by one BLT rifle 
company that had been left to secure the MEU CP and protect 
the Marines, soldiers, sailors of the CP. The attackers 
subsequently consolidated into a relatively isolated group 
of buildings previously cleared by the BLT rifle company. In 
the midst of the attack, the MEU commander authorized the 
use of the BLT’s artillery battery to defend the MEU CP. The 
target requests were transmitted to the artillery battery by 
both the MEU staff officers and the BLT rifle company’s 
Artillery Forward Observer via the traditional fire support 
communication network (i.e., both voice and data 
communication on Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, one each, 
voice communications on both Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and 
High Frequency (HF)). These requests went unanswered by the 
artillery battery. The situation dictated that every 
available means be used to communicate enemy targets to the 
artillery battery in defense of the MEU CP.  
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This researcher, as a trained Forward Observer, called 
the artillery battery using the Kuwaiti cellular phone 
issued for inter-camp coordination prior to the start of 
OIF. The artillery battery answered the cellular phone call 
and shifted to support the defense of the MEU CP. As a 
result, the Iraqi paramilitary force concentrations were 
repelled and the MEU CP remained secured.  
This combat experience posed a question: “Why can the 
most technologically advanced country on earth not develop a 
communications device that simplifies the users’ actions by 
consolidating the capabilities of the several required 
communications devices into one ‘smart’ device.” In combat, 
the warfighter should ideally carry one smart device that 
can communicate on all required networks and formats, both 
voice and data, to achieve maximum effectiveness while 
minimizing equipment.  
A. PROBLEM AND MOTIVATION 
As America’s Force-in-Readiness, the Marine Corps must 
remain a rapidly-deployable, lightweight force capable of 
successfully operating in a variety of contingencies, from 
humanitarian operations to conventional warfare. The Marine 
Corps conducts its operations using the Marine Air Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) concept.  
The goal of the MAGTF is Air-Ground coordination to 
maximize the effects of the available forces. In 
conventional combat operations, this is known as the 
application of combined arms. At the heart of the combined 
arms concept is the requirement for the Ground Combat 
Element (GCE) to synchronize and coordinate the available 
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fire support assets of the MAGTF (MCDP 1.0, 2001). The fire 
support coordination aspect of Command and Control (C2) is 
an immensely complex operation that relies heavily on both 
the communication and coordination skills of the fire-
support Marines at the tactical level.  
These tactical level warfighters are overburdened by 
multiple incomplete functional devices that provide single-
frequency-spectrum-capable communications without providing 
any other warfighting functionality,1 i.e., coordinate 
fires, track enemy locations, or show friendly maneuver in 
the vicinity. Instead, there is another device that must be 
used to display or interact with the information, and that 
additional device must be tethered to a communications 
device to retain relevant information.  
These additional devices actually increase logistical 
requirements and decrease combat capabilities by limiting 
mobility. However, by reducing the communication and 
logistics requirement of the warfighters, an organization 
may allow the company and the battalion greater flexibility 
and mobility. If a single military communication device, 
modeled after a commercial smartphone, were adapted to 
provide combat utility with warfighting functional 
applications, the device could make the user more responsive 
and lethal in combat.  
Therefore, this thesis intends to explore a smartphone 
application that could be used on a commercially available 
device that would enable the warfighter the most effective 
use of all available communication networks to conduct fire 
                     
1 MCDP 1-0 defines the six warfighting functions as: command and 
control, intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics and force protection. 
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support.  This single device would be able to transmit and 
receive information over a variety of available networks, 
including tactical cellular, and could use any required 
network in order to accomplish the warfighter’s needs at the 
tactical level. This thesis will only consider the use of 
the application at the tactical level, defined as the 
Infantry Battalion and below (e.g., Company through Fire 
Team). The secondary question is then explored: “How can the 
USMC develop such applications to benefit wartime 
communications?” 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The USMC could benefit from improved wartime 
communications via the exploration of commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) software, hardware, and the existing network 
infrastructure to begin the development of smartphone 
applications. This thesis seeks to resolve a gap in 
capabilities by providing a prototype fire support 
application that serves as a proof-of-concept for rapidly 
developed applications that have an immediate positive 
impact through enhanced warfighter capabilities. This thesis 
will focus on USMC fire support networks, although the 
lessons learned will be applicable across the joint 
services. A wireless backbone for integration with current 
fire support C2 systems, specifically the Advanced Field 







point of departure. This will involve the prototyping of a 
smartphone application to request and deconflict2 fire 
support at the tactical level.  
Current Naval network research direction, as indicated 
by Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Broad Agency Announcement 
(BAA) 55-09-07, seeks the exploration of commercial standard 
wireless networks, such as IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 
standards, as extensions to the tactical edge network (Naval 
Research Laboratory, 2007). This prototype cannot succeed 
without progress in the adoption of all wireless 
communication methods to extend the tactical edge of the 
fire support network. This thesis will further pursue the 
exploration of any communications paths currently provided 
via commercial smartphones such as IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 
802.16 resident on most devices.  
More recent is the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) research direction published as BAA 10-41 
(DARPA, 2010). The BAA titled Transformative Apps, called 
for “innovative research in the area of tactical application 
development, evaluation and enhancements…to place the right 
mobile software applications (“apps”) into the hands of the 
warfighter as the apps are needed” (DARPA, 2010). The 
announcement goes on to discuss the creation of an Apps 
Marketplace Architecture and the estimated further research 
areas the BAA will spawn. The NRL and DARPA BAAs provided a 
strong foundation for this researcher to attempt to resolve 
                     
2 In MCWP 3-16, deconfliction is defined as the process of ensuring 
fire support agencies’ targets, timelines and battlefield geometries are 
able to achieve the optimum effects in support of the ground commander’s 
scheme of maneuver without incurring unnecessary risk to friendly 
personnel or equipment. 
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a capabilities gap in Marine Corps fire support by using a 
smartphone to get fires down to the tactical edge. 
The Marine Corps fire support network needs to take the 
next logical step of adopting all relevant, existing, and 
foreseeable future networking technologies to fill any gaps 
for an enhanced network using redundant network nodes for 
fire support C2. The emergence of chat and chat-based 
services to provide notifications of changes in friendly 
locations, fire support plans, or fire support coordination 
measures, has emerged throughout the current operating 
environment. The chat-based services became a de facto 
standard network requirement for fire support deconfliction 
in the Joint and Combined3 operating environments of both 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) (Eovito, 2006). These chat-based services are now 
equally important to the tactical level warfighter from the 
company level to the individual Marine, as evidenced in the 
Capability Set 5 Urgent Needs Statement (Hastings, 2009). 
This evidence provides the impetus for immediate exploration 
of smartphone devices to provide these types of services for 
the warfighter. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will be guided by the following questions: 
• How can COTS software developmental tools be used 
to produce a smartphone application to aid the 
transition between traditional radio equipment and 
a tactical cellular network?   
                     
3 Joint operations refer to operations where two or more military 
departments operate; combined operations involve two or more allied 
nations or agencies (JP 1-02, 2011). 
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• How does the SMART Fires application fit into 
existing and future Command and Control platforms 
in integrating information into a Common Tactical 
Picture (CTP) that will assist the warfighter?  
• How effective will these COTS applications be in 
aiding the warfighter (e.g., target location 
precision, request latency, situational awareness 
increases, and efficiency)? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The thesis will not attempt to design the “best” fire 
support application, thereby requiring a rewrite of doctrine 
to include tactical cellular or WiFi or even WiMax networks 
as required. Neither will this research attempt to include 
communications security concerns or network security 
concerns that would exist for integration into the current 
system. This research, however, seeks to demonstrate a proof 
-of-concept to verify that the fire support application, 
Smartphone to AFATDS Prototype (SMART) Fires, is feasible. 
If feasible, then the SMART Fires application would be 
capable of leveraging a future cellular wireless technology 
for the military.  
The Marine Corps’ fire support infrastructure was 
chosen because of the readily available resources, including 
the author’s background as a Marine Artillery Officer; 
however, the results of the research are applicable across 
all six warfighting functions. After further refinement of 
the technology, we believe the SMART Fires application can 
provide the basis for further application development in 
support of a platform hardened to Military Standards 
(MILSTD), capable of all wireless communication requirements 
for any tactical traffic. We envision that these efforts 
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will springboard other warfighting communities to design and 
implement similar supporting applications to enable those 
Marines to better perform their function in combat. By 
furthering the study of COTS Software Development Kits 
(SDKs) to harness these existing commercial technologies in 
a form that remains rapidly developable by the warfighter, 
our research intends to reduce the logistics required for 
Marines to remain America’s force-in-readiness and to 
continue to win America’s battles. 
This thesis seeks to validate a proof-of-concept 
whereby cellular technology can provide a fire support 
network that is flexible and capable of rapid integration 
using existing wireless infrastructure in any theater of 
operation, and then transition back and forth to tactical 
radio nets as required. The research, though conducted in 
the narrow scope of Marine-specific fire support operations 
at the tactical level, can be transitioned across the 
Department of Defense (DoD). 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This first chapter provides an overview of known 
discrepancies within the Marine Corps’ fire support network 
infrastructure. The chapter goes on to suggest objectives 
that can be achieved through the successful integration of 
the SMART Fires application as a part of the overall 
adoption of smartphone integration into military wireless 
communications. Finally, the chapter outlines the research 
questions that were evaluated and will guide the remainder 
of this research. 
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Chapter II discusses the current state of the USMC fire 
support networks and the current fire support 
software/hardware platforms. It outlines the coordination 
requirements for a USMC tactical fire support network, 
including the required communication nodes and C2 actions to 
successfully conduct fire support.  
Chapter III provides a background for previous tactical 
cellular network integration. It outlines the selection of 
the operating system for development of the application 
prototype and provides a description of the Android™ 
environment. It provides user requirements and an evaluation 
of support by the fully developed application Finally, the 
chapter finishes with a description of the Eclipse™ 
integrated development environment and the Commonsware(LLC) 
references used in the development of the SMART Fires 
application. 
Chapter IV presents the SMART Fires prototype 
requirements and design  
The results and final conclusions of the proof-of-
concept are given in Chapter V. The chapter also sets forth 
recommendations for continued development of SMART Fires and 
the best way ahead for SMART applications. 
 10 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides the necessary background 
regarding previous research as to why and how smartphones 
and a tactical cellular network, integrated with the 
existing military wireless network, could help to fill 
existing communications gaps and extend significant network 
capability to the warfighter. The chapter then describes the 
organization of the Marine Corps fire support agencies and 
the composition of the tactical level agencies. The chapter 
elaborates on current equipment and systems implemented to 
conduct fire support at the tactical level. It further 
outlines the coordination requirements for those tactical 
fire support systems to successfully request and deconflict 
a “call for fire.”  
A. WHY SMARTPHONES 
The platform for a smartphone integrates several 
current standalone system capabilities into a singular 
device. These hardware capabilities include: accelerometer, 
gyroscope, compass, cameras (forward and/or rear facing) for 
still or video, Global Positioning System (GPS), cellular 
transceiver for voice and/or data, Bluetooth™ personal area 
network (PAN) interface, WiFi 802.11 standard Local Area 
Network (LAN) interface, in some cases the WiMAX 802.16 
standard Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) interface, and the 
ability to communicate over all of these wireless networks. 
Both Android and iPhone application markets have 
applications that can initiate a pairing through the 
accelerometer then use the 802.11 standard or cellular data 
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connection to communicate using a cloud infrastructure; the 
BUMP™ application is one such example (BUMP, 2011). The 
current data rates are up to 31 Mbps per second for mobile 
WiMAX (Benes & Prokopec, 2011) and 45 Mbps for Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) (Wylie-Green & Svensson, 2010); mobile WiFi 
connectivity with 802.11n, still achieved data rates in 
excess of 15 Mbps (Lin, Tzu, Lin, & Lee, 2009), and the 
hardware chipsets required to conduct WiFi calling or 
Unlicensed Mobile Access (UWA) directly or using Voice over 
WiFi (VoWiFi) also exist. These current capabilities, among 
others, were the impetus for both the United States Army 
(USA) and the USMC to explore smartphone technology 
integrated into the tactical network. 
The SMART Fires application is a prototype that will 
demonstrate a proof-of-concept that COTS SDKs can be used by 
the operating forces to implement new ideas into a rapidly 
deployable software application for smartphones. This type 
of rapid prototype development is only possible if the 
Marine Corps adopts the appropriate wireless infrastructure. 
Since there is no open developmental environment for 
programs of record that currently exist in the Marine Corps, 
Joshua S. Dixon’s thesis, “Integrating Cellular Handset 
Capabilities with Marine Corps Tactical Communications,” 
published in May of 2010, lays out the concepts that, if 
adopted, could leverage the high mobility and unique 
computing capability resident in most smartphones in the 
commercial market without having to wait through the delay 
of the traditional military acquisitions process. Since the 
commercial market is driven by the competition of other 
hardware and service providers to put out a cutting edge 
technology product, it stimulates innovation and furthers 
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the requirement for providers to deliver the best available 
product at all times. The risk associated with the 
commercial market is principally financial (O’Neal & Dixon, 
2011). A company’s failure to deliver the most current 
technology allows competitors to gain market share and the 
affected company will lose revenue. The risk of the 
military’s failure to adopt emergent technology has much 
greater consequences since it could mean a weakened national 
defense and military advantages forfeited to nations or 
nonstate actors that do adopt the leading edge of 
technology.  
Dixon proposed two solutions to integrate smartphones 
into military tactical communications: wired and wireless. 
The wired approach is referred to as the tethered concept. 
This concept adopts the integration technique used for the 
AN/PSC-13 Dismounted-Data Automated Communications Terminal 
(D-DACT). The device can be used independently of military 
communication systems or can be integrated directly through 
a wired connection to a SINCGARS radio set. Although 
tethering does provide solutions to security concerns, since 
it uses a military radio for integration, the true benefits 
of the highly mobile smartphone are not yet fully leveraged.  
The wireless approach has two paths that provide 
avenues to smartphone integration in tactical 
communications. The first method, indirect bridging, 
requires the use of additional hardware integrated into the 
tactical communications networks. These networks leverage 
mobile base stations to provide the required small scale 
capabilities of larger metropolitan cellular base stations 
in the footprint of a single tactical vehicle. There are a 
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variety of hardware solutions that fulfill the needs of an 
indirect bridging solution; however, the Open Base 
Transceiver Station project (OpenBTS) offers the ability to 
connect Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
standard smartphones on the tactical network with VoIP 
clients, without the hardware overhead required in 
commercial cellular networks.  
The commercial cellular infrastructure is composed of 
the Base Transceiver Station (BTS), the Base Station 
Controller (BSC), and the Mobile Switching Center (MSC). The 
wireless connection between the GSM-capable cellular device 
and the GSM network is provided by the BTS. As a cellular 
device moves from one coverage area to another, the BSC 
provides a portion of the handover functionality that 
enables the transition. Finally, the MSC provides the main 
functionality for BTS transition and the end-to-end 
connections that either begin or end with a cellular device 
in its coverage area. This commercial GSM infrastructure is 




Figure 1.   Commercial cellular MSC-BSC architecture 
(From Dixon, 2010). 
In OpenBTS, the Universal Software Radio Peripheral 
(USRP) uses Asterix© Private Branch Exchange (PBX) to 
provide the required GSM functionality to make and receive 
VoIP calls. OpenBTS replaces the BTS, BSC and the MSC with a 
minimal infrastructure composed of a hardware device capable 
of running the open source software, OpenBTS and Asterix© 
PBX, and other software to enable a VoIP client on the 
hardware device. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 will 
illustrate the reduction in equipment between a standard 
commercial cellular infrastructure and the minimum OpenBTS 
infrastructure required to complete a voice call. 
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Figure 2.   OpenBTS architecture (From Dixon, 2010). 
The final integration method in Captain Dixon’s work is 
Direct Interfacing. The work goes on to explain that by the 
military creating the need for marginal, military-specific 
(MIL-SPEC), adaptations to the commercial hardware, 
producers could create hardware modularity in handsets 
intended for dual purpose use, commercial and/or military 
applications. Secondly, the notion of software portability 
is introduced to provide a method for the smartphone and 
tactical handset modifications to be made to the software 
and firmware loaded into the handsets, both cellular and 
military tactical radios, for integration into one another’s 
networks. The integration is proposed by three solutions: 
(i) adding a MIL-SPEC signal to smartphone, (ii) adding 
commercial cellular signal capability to the military radio, 
or (iii) modifying cellular protocol to be useable by both 
smartphones and military radios. Each proposal provides 
unique answers to integration and new areas of security 
concerns. All three are theoretically feasible solutions for 
smartphone integration into tactical military networks, 
though not necessarily monetarily viable. Whatever solution 
or integration technique is chosen, the fact remains that 
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this technology could provide both computing and networking 
capabilities that would enhance tactical operations in a 
form with which the individual Marine or soldier is very 
familiar. So, with a familiar platform, the ease of use and 
navigation of the new system is second nature, allowing the 
focus of the users to return to their warfighting task. 
With respect to the scope of this research, that 
warfighting task is requesting fire support in the form of a 
Call For Fire (CFF). The CFF, however, is the critical 
information that must pass through a detailed and refined 
coordination and deconfliction4 process before it is 
realized—when the artilleryman manning his weapon system 
fires a projectile at the target. The Marine Corps-specific 
CFF process is provided for an understanding of the current 
standing voice CFF procedure. It is our belief that through 
an examination of both the tactical organizations who 
conduct fire support coordination, combined with the tasks 
required by the entry level Marine with Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) 0861-Fire Support Man, that the 
proof of how an intuitive SMART Fires application will 
positively benefit this fire support process and may be 
revealed.  
B. MARINE CORPS FIRE SUPPORT 
Fire support coordination is among the most complex 
processes that America’s military performs during 
conventional wartime operations. Transient to the levels of 
                     
4In MCWP 3.16 deconfliction is defined as the coordination with 
higher and adjacent units during fire support planning. Deconfliction is 
facilitated through the fire support coordination measures (FSCM) and 
separation of the gun to target line by time or space with friendly 
units. 
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war, fire support at the strategic level directly impacts 
the tactical level, and vice versa. As a result of this 
transient nature, fire supporters executing the fire support 
plan must be able to coordinate with all levels of command. 
This communications requirement crosses geographical, 
service and national boundaries to maximize the effects of 
limited fire support assets, and to be most effective, it 
requires the best technology available. Without this 
communication, our nation risks squandering assets and, most 
importantly, the lives of our warfighters. 
1. Marine Unit Organization 
A traditional Marine Corps artillery battalion is 
composed of three artillery firing batteries that provide 
fire support to the supported maneuver infantry battalions 
and a headquarters battery that provides the equipment and 
staff to enable command and control for the artillery 
battalion (MCWP 3-16.1, 2002). The artillery battalion 
provides fire support for the maneuver infantry regiment in 
two ways; first, through the organic artillery firing 
batteries providing close and continuous fires to the 
supported infantry battalion, and second, by providing the 
fire support personnel and equipment to conduct fire support 
planning and coordination to both the infantry regimental 
commander and the infantry battalion commanders. The unit 
organization and supporting relationships are shown in 
Figure 3. The tactical fire support organizations formed at 
the infantry battalion and down to the companies are 



























Figure 3.   Artillery-to-maneuver tactical organization 
and support relationships. 
2. Marine Fire Support Organizations 
Tactical fire support is executed on behalf of the 
supported maneuver commander; therefore, the tactical fire 
support organizations are co-located with the maneuver 
commander’s Combat Operations Center (COC). Tactical fire 
support organizations exist at every level within the 
infantry command structure, from the division to the 
company. The infantry battalion level fire support 
organization is the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). 
The FSCC is a composite organization made up of both the 
infantry battalion personnel and the supporting artillery 
battery’s liaison section personnel (MCWP 3-16, 1999). The 
next level of fire support organization at the infantry 
company is the Fire Support Team (FiST). The FiST is also a 
composite organization, with members of both the infantry 
company and the supporting artillery battery’s Forward 
 20 
Observer (FO) team. The artillery battery FO team is the 
first fire support organization employed in support of the 
infantry (FM 6-30, 1991), to advise the infantry company 
commander on the employment of artillery fires in support of 
the company’s scheme-of-maneuver (MCWP 3-16.6, 1998). 
a. Composition 
Starting first at this lowest level, the FO team 
consists of four members:  
• Forward Observer–MOS 0802 
• Fire Support Man–MOS 0861 
• two Radio Operators–MOS 0621 
The FO Team then takes its place as part of the 
Fire Support Team (FiST). The company FiST and battalion 
FSCC have a parallel structure to facilitate simultaneous 
coordination and deconfliction between the FiST and their 
counterparts at the FSCC. 
The FiST and the FSCC contain a representative 
from each supporting arm. At these two organizations the 
infantry representative also serves as the leader for the 
organization since he is appointed by the commander of the 
unit the fires are supporting. The FiST composition is: 
• FiST Leader (infantryman)-MOS 0302 
• FO Team (artillery)–MOS 0802 
• mortarman observer–MOS 0341 
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• Close Air Support (CAS) representative5–MOS 7502 
or 8002 
• Naval Gunfire (NGF) spot team  
At the FSCC, each supporting arm is represented, 
providing a thorough knowledge of the employment of each 
supporting arm to the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC). The 
representatives for the various supporting arms are:  
• FSC (infantryman)–MOS 0302 
• Artillery Liaison Officer (Arty LNO)–MOS 0802 
• Senior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) mortarman 
observer–MOS 0341 
• Air Officer (AO)–MOS 7502 
• Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO)–MOS 0845 
All representatives are assisted by more radio 
operators and, for the artillery and the NGLO, by an 
enlisted advisor that enhances the experience level in the 
FSCC (MCWP 3-16.6, 1998). The NGLO and the NGF spot teams 
are collectively known as the Shore Fire Control Party 
(SFCP) (MCWP 3-16.6, 1998). 
b. Communications 
Many radio assets and systems are required to 
support the coordination of fires. Each arm of the combined-
arms team has at a minimum one radio network and the 
associated dedicated radio assets used by that 
representative on the FiST. The information regarding the 
communications that support the fire support efforts will be 
                     
5 Either a Naval Aviator or Naval Flight Officer with current 
qualifications who earned MOS 7502 serving as a Forward Air Controller 
(FAC) or a trained observer that has passed all certifications and 
qualifications and earned a secondary MOS 8002 as a Joint Terminal Air 
Controller (JTAC) (NAVMC 3500.42, 2008). 
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separated by radios and systems, which together, provide the 
required communications to conduct fire support. 
(i) Radio Assets.  Radio assets can either be 
vehicle-mounted or man-portable (manpack).  The radio assets 
included in this work will be limited to those allocated to 
the FO Team and the rest of the FiST as this is the focus of 
the SMART Fires application. The FiST also, typically, 
requires mobility, so radios that cannot be manpack are 
seldom used by the majority of the FiSTs. The exceptions are 
FiSTs tasks organized to a particular mission set such as 
the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) company or a company of 
M1A1 Tanks in support of a maneuver unit that is required to 
execute a portion of the overarching fire support plan. The 
current doctrinal communication networks require the use of 
High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF), and Ultra 
High Frequency (UHF). HF networks can use the AN/PRC-150(C) 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   AN/PRC-150(C) High Frequency Manpack (From 
Harris Corporation, 2011). 
VHF assets are more prolific. As such, a 
greater effort by the acquisitions community has been placed 
on reducing the size of the manpack VHF radio set. Three 
primary VHF-capable radios are currently used and they 
provide both VHF and UHF capability in a manpack form. The 
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three radios currently used for both VHF and UHF 
communications are the AN/PRC-117F V1(C) Multi-Band Multi-
Mission Manpack Radios (MBMMR) shown in Figure 5, the 
AN/PRC-148 V2(C) Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radios (MBITR), 
and the AN/PRC-152 Multi-Band Multi-Mission Handheld Radios 
(MMHR) both shown in Figure 6.  
It is not uncommon, when conducting FiST 
operations, to have one radio to support the 81mm mortar 
conduct of fire (COF) communications network and two radios 
for simultaneously monitoring the artillery COF voice and 
data, as well as the non-doctrinally-based battery fire 
coordination (FSCOORD). The latter is used for coordination 
between FO and the battery Fire Direction Officer (FDO).  
 
Figure 5.   AN/PRC-117F (C) Multi-Band Multi-Mission 
Manpack Radios (From Harris Corporation, 2011). 
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Figure 6.   AN/PRC-148 V2(C) Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team 
Radio, (left) and AN/PRC-152 Multi-Band Multi-
Mission Handheld Radios (right) (From Harris 
Corporation, 2011). 
The FAC or JTAC would have one radio for 
direct UHF communications to the aircraft providing CAS, and 
one radio for VHF communications to either the AO at the 
battalion FSCC, or the Air Support Element (ASE) or Direct 
Air Support Center (DASC) at the Regiment or Division, 
respectively, to request CAS sorties in support of the FiST.  
The NGF spot teams would have two radios. One 
radio provides HF communications to the ships providing 
support on the Naval Ground Spot network used to coordinate 
surface fires from NGF ships. The other radio provides VHF 
communications to the NGLO at the battalion FSCC for 
coordination of missions on the SFCP local radio network. 
As previously discussed, the FiST uses 
several different radios and communication networks to 
properly apply combined arms, maximizing the lethality of 
the MAGTF. Different components of the FiST are each charged 
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with coordinating their own fire support activity with the 
overall fire support plan to support the infantry maneuver. 
For example, the mortar FO coordinates with the battalion’s 
81mm Mortar platoon, the artillery FO team coordinates with 
the supporting artillery battery, and the FAC or JTAC 
coordinates with CAS assets on station. After all fire 
support agencies, mortars, artillery and CAS confirm they 
can simultaneously support the fire support plan, the FiST 
leader establishes a time-on-target (TOT) for the CAS and 
the timeline for mortars and artillery is established.  
The FiSTs deconflict their requested missions 
by submitting them to the battalion FSCC. The battalion FSC 
is the battalion commander’s appointed representative to 
approve or deny fires in support of the maneuver. The FSC is 
the final authority on approval of fire missions by the line 
companies and requires the most complicated communications 
support plan at the tactical level. One item that must be 
considered is that although many communications experts 
believed that the introduction of digital (data) 
communications would decrease the number of radios for fire 
support, it actually nearly doubled the requirements. It 
doubled the requirements for the fire supporters due to lack 
of trust in a digital device producing the same level of 
results as the traditional voice call for fire. The current 
and doctrinal nets for the FiST, FSCC, mortar platoon, NGF 




C - Net Control
X - Guard





















































































































































































































Infantry Bn FSCC X R R X X X C R C C R X
DS Artillery Battery R R X X X X R C C C R
FO Team R X R
FAC R X X X
Mortar FO X
NGF Spot Team X X
NGF Ships X R X X X
Mortar Platoon C
Notes:
* Data and/or Voice nets  
Table 1.  Current and doctrinal FSCOORD nets (After MCDP 
3-16, 1999).6 
(ii) Data Systems.  For every fire support 
agency that could provide fire support to the line 
companies, internal standard operating procedures actually 
required redundant voice and data nets. Specifically, for 
artillery, when digital communications were beginning to 
enter the operating forces in the early 1990s, the AN/PSC-2 
Digital Communications Tool (DCT), shown on the left in 
Figure 7, required a dedicated VHF radio to which it was 
tethered via cable for a digital Artillery COF net and 
another separate VHF asset to be used as a voice COF. 
                     
6 Self-generated table from author’s knowledge of internal infantry 
battalion and DS artillery battery operations, with doctrinal support by 
(MCWP 3-16, 1999). 
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This doubled the COF requirement for radios, 
since parallel communications were now required for the 
submission of digital CFFs with a voice confirmation of 
receipt or clarification. The same parallel communications 
networks are now required for the NGF Spot Net with the 
advent of the Naval Fire Control System (NFCS). This 
provides digital communications between the ship providing 
fire support and either the spotter or the firing battery 
with an AN/PSC-13 D-DACT, shown on the right in Figure 7, or 
the joint fire support system of record in the DoD, the 
AN/GYK-47(V) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
(AFATDS), shown in Figure 8. AFATDS remains the gateway for 
all digital communications to enter the current FSCOORD 
architecture in the Marine Corps for the foreseeable future. 
 
Figure 7.   On the left the AN/PSC-2 Digital 
Communications Terminal (From Ebay, 2011) and on 
the right the AN/PSC-13 Dismounted-Data Automated 




Figure 8.   AN/GYK-47 (V) Advanced Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (From PM FATDS, 2004). 
The scope of the previous section was limited 
to the lowest organizational echelon to create an 
understanding of the CFF process at the tactical level. The 
tactical CFF model, however, can be traced to specific 
techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) and scenarios 
(more or less restrictive rules of engagement (ROE)) 
modeling the Fires process at any level of command or joint 
combined service environment. It is this organizational 
scope that led to the tactical CFF model and, using a 
restrictive method for clearance, forced numerous 
coordination actions amongst all of the performers at the 
fire support organizations. 
C. CFF PROCESS 
The voice CFF or as-is CFF process is a result of 
several factors. The factors are common throughout the 
author’s experience for newly established support 
relationships between the supported infantry battalion and 
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the supporting artillery battery. These factors facilitate 
increased and continuous coordination interactions between 
the numerous participants using centralized7 clearance for 
the Marine infantry battalion with a Marine artillery 
battery providing Direct Support (DS) (MCWP 3-16, 1999). 
Centralized clearance is the most restrictive, requiring the 
highest degree of inter-level coordination. The tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) modeled are also very 
restrictive, which complement restrictive rules of 
engagement (ROE) and can also be attributed to the level of 
fire support proficiency at the battalion.  
1. Process Flow 
FO Team: 
• Gathers target data for inclusion in CFF, 
location, relative direction & distance, target 
description. 
• Formats target data into call for fire format. 
• Initiates voice communications with FiST to pass 





                     
7 Centralized is opposite of decentralized message clearance where 
the CFFs are transmitted directly to the fire support agency. The FSCC 
monitors CFF transmissions over the radio net and positively clears the 
CFF as approved or denied over the net before the fire support agency 
can provide fires on the target. Centralized clearance requires all CFF 
transmissions to be routed through the FSCC. The CFF will then be 
transmitted from the FSCC to the fire support agency after approval by 
the FSC. Any mission received by the fire support agency from the FSCC 
is approved and cleared to fire. After receipt of the CFF, by the 
agency, there are direct communications between the observer and the 
fire support agency, and the FSCC only monitors the net for unsafe 
conditions (MCWP 3-16, 1999).  
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FiST: 
• Verifies that the CFF is safe to be fired. In 
order to do this he asks the question first: “Does 
the CFF violate any known Fire Support 
Coordination Measures8 (FSCMs)?”  
• If the answer is yes, the request is denied. 
• If the answer is no, then FiST Leader proceeds 
with processing. 
• Validates that the target data is a viable target 
that supports the current infantry scheme of 
maneuver.  
• If the answer is yes, the target is approved at 
the Company level. 
• If the answer is no, the target is denied.  
• Conducts low level weaponeering9, validates 
whether the target can be successfully engaged 
with the company’s organic asset,  
• If the answer is yes, the CFF is transmitted to 
60mm mortar platoon for prosecution.  
• If the answer is no, he proceeds with processing. 
• Performs another weaponeering assessment for the 
appropriate asset to prosecute the target. 
• Formats the CFF according to the agency being 
requested, i.e., Naval Gunfire CFF, Close Air 
Support 9-line10.  
FSCC: 
• Verifies whether the CFF violates any FSCMs 
• If the answer is yes, the request is denied.  
                     
8 A restrictive FSCM is established in order to protect friendly 
maneuver units or protect locations that should not be directly engaged 
with fires i.e., historical/religious sites, or critical infrastructure 
(MCWP 3-16, 1999).  
9 Weaponeering is the process of matching targets to the appropriate 
weapon system in order to achieve the desired effects without 
squandering resources (MCWP 3-16, 1999).  
10 The formats for the standard CFF, the NGF CFF and the 9-line are 
provided for the reader in Appendices A, B, and C. 
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• If the answer is no, he proceeds with processing. 
• Verifies whether the CFF is formatted properly for 
the agency being requested,  
• If the answer is no, the CFF is denied and sent 
back to the FiST for reformatting.  
• If the answer is yes, then the CFF request 
proceeds with processing. 
• Conducts weaponeering, validates whether the FiST 
selected an appropriate fire support agency for 
the target. 
• If the answer is yes, the CFF is forwarded to the 
agency as approved. 
• If the answer is no, then the FSC would inform the 
FiST of the decision to assign the mission to a 
different fire support asset, then properly format 
the CFF for the new asset as required.  
• Verifies whether the agency being assigned is 
capable of firing at that time. 
• If the answer is yes, the CFF is forwarded as 
approved.   
• If the answer is no, then the CFF is reformatted 
as required and forwarded to the next available 
asset as approved. 
This process is rehearsed over and over to train the 
fire support organizations to be as efficient as possible 
and maximize the use of all available fire support assets. 
This background information provides the necessary 
foundation to evaluate the limitations of the current fire 
support systems, both the digital devices and the extensive 
use of stove-piped, at most, dual-banded radio assets. In 
order to assist this research a business model of how the 
SMART Fires application could increase unit efficiency was 
created using the Savvion™ business process modeling 
software. 
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2. CFF Savvion™ Model 
A low level of proficiency at the FSCC, FiST or FO team 
level will cause the FSC to clear all missions and not allow 
any missions to be sent to a fire support agency until the 
CFF have been approved for both content and format. In 
particular, a fire support team with low proficiency, 
operating under restrictive ROE and exercising centralized 
clearance is the most restrictive scenario for operations at 
the battalion level. This was the situation battalions faced 
before a deployment into OEF. It is essential then that the 
CFF Savvion™ model simulate this all-too-common situation to 
demonstrate the direct impact to the joint operating forces. 
The Savvion™ model follows the sequence of individual 
actions described in the process flow section of this 
chapter.  
a. As-Is Process 
To facilitate a deeper understanding of how the 
as-is CFF process can benefit from the SMART Fires 
application, a business model was created of the as-is 
process using the Savvion™ software application and is 
depicted in Figure 9. The model’s processes and actors are 
shown in a simplified form representative of the actual CFF 
process. There is a high level of complexity in the CFF 
process modeled. These added complexities will attribute to 




Figure 9.   Savvion™ Model of the As-Is voice CFF 
process. 
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The processes represented by the model are the 
specific tasks and actions that must be taken by the 
respective coordination agent in order to provide fire 
support in response to a CFF. The Savvion™ model can provide 
information about where lag times and bottlenecks occur in 
the As-Is process. These bottlenecks decrease the fire 
support organization’s efficiency and slow down the response 
times of the fire support agencies. The Savvion™ model is 
provided along with results from the simulation of the As-Is 
process in Appendices E and F and the To-Be process G and H. 
b. To-Be Process 
The results of the modeling effort once a SMART 
Fires application are implemented into the training scenario 
with the same group of personnel at the FO, FiST and FSCC by 
using a smartphone device that takes target data and 
converts it to any CFF format required. Process times were 
reduced due to the implementation of the SMART Fires 
application’s capabilities and integration of the 
smartphone’s positional location hardware, large display, 
touch or voice input capability. Increased situational 
awareness was also provided by the use of other C2 
applications that display real-time locations for friendly 
units. We created a “To-Be” process model of how the ideal 




Figure 10.   Savvion™ Model of the To-Be digital CFF 
process using the SMART Fires application. 
 36 
A comparison between the “As-Is” model and the 
“To-Be” model demonstrates initial validation for the SMART 
Fires application, thus, assisted scout observers may 
enhance the warfighting capability of the entire fire 
support organization and the process resulting in more 
responsive fires. The Savvion™ model for the “To-Be” model 
is provided along with results from the simulation in 
Appendices G and H. 
c. Savvion™ Results 
The comparison of the As-Is and To-Be Savvion™ 
models demonstrated that a SMART Fires application capable 
of integrating smartphone capabilities into the existing 
fire support network could greatly increase efficiency and 
warfighting capability. The simulation replicated an eight 
hour training evolution for an infantry battalion conducting 
live fire training. The As-Is model produced ten 
successfully executed CFFs. The To-Be model with integration 
of the SMART Fires application successfully executed one 
hundred CFFs. The simulations resulted in a ten times 
increase in the efficiency of the overall CFF process 
modeled. These results help conclude that the FO 
capabilities were greatly enhanced with the smartphone 
running the SMART Fires application.  
Next, we present the current smartphone 
integration efforts for military wireless communications and 
the benefits of the Android platform selected for the SMART 
Fires application. Additionally the requirements of the user 
are matched to the capabilities of an Android smartphone. 
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III. SMARTPHONE INTEGRATION 
This chapter provides a background for smartphone 
integration into military wireless communications. The 
chapter describes both commercial and DoD efforts to 
integrate smartphone technology. It further provides the 
reasons why the Android platform was selected for the SMART 
Fires application as well as a detailed explanation of how 
the Android OS software stack best supports the application. 
The chapter concludes with a solution to current fire 
support limitations in an analysis of how the SMART Fires 
application running on the Android OS assists the users’ 
tactical mission requirements.  
A. PREVIOUS EFFORTS 
Prior to selecting an SDK for development, a smartphone 
OS had to be chosen. Research was conducted into existing 
smartphone integration and the operating systems used in 
those efforts. These previous efforts then facilitated a 
decision for the OS platform that best suited rapid 
development of the SMART Fires application. Our research 
revealed that efforts across DoD have favored two OS 
platforms over the variety of other options, namely: Apple’s 
iPhone OS and Google’s Android OS. 
1. Commercial Integration 
Efforts for smartphone integration and developmental 
exploration have come from numerous sources both within and 
outside of the DoD. The results and products are varied; 
however, the focus has been primarily on two smartphone 
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platforms:  Apple’s iPhone and Google’s Android OS. Although 
corporate efforts are not limited to the iPhone and the 
Android systems, these efforts were available for public and 
system information.  
a. General Dynamics 
In conjunction with Itronix, General Dynamics (GD) 
has created the GD300, shown in Figure 11. It is advertised 
as a rugged, wearable computer, with an integrated GPS high 
gain antenna and it utilizes the Android™ open operating 
system (General Dynamics, 2011). The GD300 was recently 
tested in a simulated operational environment exercise held 
by the Army to test the operational feasibility of 
smartphone integration at the tactical level. This testing 
of the GD300 was conducted using the Tactical Ground 
Reporting (TIGR) application installed. This type of 
tactical application provided real-time positional location 
of friendly forces and suspected enemy positions. 
The GD300 and the TIGR application together 
provide a venue for the acceptance of the SMART Fires 
application once fully developed. The Android based OS used 
for the GD300 if proven successful would be the optimum 
development platform for the SMART Fires application, since 
the existing TIGR application could provide an existing 
application that can provide both friendly and suspected 
enemy locations both of which are required to safely 
deconflict fires and initiate a successful CFF. 
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Figure 11.   The GD300 is a ruggedized wearable computing 
platform using the Android Open Operating System 
(From General Dynamics, 2011). 
b. Lockheed Martin 
The MONAX© system, shown in Figure 12, is 
developed by Lockheed Martin Corporation and is an iPhone-
based system that integrates the COTS iPhone smartphone with 
a MONAX Lynx sleeve that connects the smartphone to the 
MONAX secure network, the XG BS infrastructure. This 
networking infrastructure, which is proprietary to Lockheed 
Martin, is advertised to provide, via mobile ground stations 
or located onboard airborne platforms, commercial cellular 
infrastructure to the user. The MONAX system communicates 
using a non-traditional RF 4G cellular signal and is also 
capable of “exportable military-grade encryption” (Lockheed 
Martin Corp, 2010). The MONAX brochure also advertised the 
availability of an App Store™ twenty-four hours a day, seven 
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days a week for users of the MONAX system. The applications 
available at the time of the brochure’s release were 
described as having the ability to assist the warfighter’s 
situational awareness (SA) and C2. MONAX believed it 
achieved this by providing facial recognition software 
capability, ISR data access, and automated mission reports 
(Lockheed Martin, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 12.   Handheld portion of the MONAX system with 
MONAX Lynx sleeve with COTS iPhone (From Lockheed 
Martin, 2010). 
c. Raytheon 
Raytheon’s efforts into the military smartphone 
integration foray came in 2009 when they created the ill-
fated One Force Tracker™ application for the iPhone, and the 
more successful Raytheon Android™ Tactical System (RATS™), 
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shown in Figure 13 (Raytheon, 2011). Although information on 
the company website was limited, the One Force Tracker™ 
program was later cancelled in 2011, however the RATS™ 
system has seen continued development. The RATS™ device is 
designed to assist intelligence collaboration, enable real-
time full-motion video and imagery, and harness social 
networking functionalities to enhance situational awareness 
using Android™ open software architecture (Woyke, 2009). 
Although the RATS™ device claims to be the first device to 
harness the Android architecture, there have not been any 
further releases of information about the RATS program from 
Raytheon (Raytheon, 2011). 
 
Figure 13.   Raytheon’s RATS™ smartphone device for 
military integration (From Raytheon, 2011). 
2. DoD Efforts 
a. Tactical NAV 
The first public attempt to integrate smartphone 
technology, specifically application development, for the 
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iPhone OS to assist the tactical warfighter is from a fellow 
artillery officer in the United States Army. Captain 
Jonathan J. Springer privately funded the development of an 
iPhone application that he states “is just as accurate as 
some of the most expensive military GPS systems that are 
being issued by our soldiers today” (Thompson, 2011). The 
application, named Tactical NAV, included the ability to 
plot and plan routes for patrols, display positional 
location information in the Military Grid Reference System 
(MGRS) that is commonly printed on tactical maps issued 
within the military, and display direction in MILS11 (Fox 
News, 2011).  
Tactical NAV also integrated the camera resident 
on the iPhone with the capability to stamp photographic 
images with a position and time. Additional features of the 
Tactical NAV included: navigation to an input grid location, 
Go-to-Grid; ability to overlay 1 kilometer grid squares over 
satellite maps; a night mode for ease of view in low-light 
situations without the bright screen giving away one’s 
position; and position sharing via e-mail. Recently, 
Tactical NAV introduced a new version, 2.0, that added 
improvements to the GUI and added navigational functionality 
to way-points. It is currently available on the iTunes App 
Store for $5.99 (Tactical NAV, 2010).  
                     
11 MILS are a unit of angular measure. 1 MIL equals 1/6400th of a 
circle. MILS are traditionally used in military units where the 
precision of angular measurement is critical to mission execution i.e., 
artillery and mortars. The MIL relation formula also converts angular 
measurement into a measured length, since at a distance of 1000m, 1 MIL 
= 1 meter (MCWP 3-16.6, 1998). 
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Tactical NAV was a private venture; however, 
application development by the Army has been formalized by a 
new program of record.  
b. CSDA 
CSDA is an ongoing effort in the ARCIC that 
explores the value of using smartphones to provide soldiers 
applications to perform everyday functions ranging from 
administration to combat operations(ARCIC, 2011). CSDA’s 
approach to development has been to simultaneously develop 
both of what they label Generating Force and Operating Force 
applications. 
Generating Force applications are targeted for the 
new trainee or for augmenting school training in the 
classroom with an application. Two respective examples are 
an application that provided mobile access to the Army Blue 
Book12 and the Patriot Missile Crew Drills, which enabled 
soldiers’ learning by use of a virtual soldier in the 
application. The Operating Force applications include 
position location and identification reporting, CFF (no 
further information was publicly available about this CFF 
application), and requests for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) 
(ARCIC, 2011).  
The most unique characteristic of the development 
efforts at CSDA is that the soldiers learn how to program 
the applications themselves. The efforts for application 
development at CSDA have taken place on both the iPhone and 
Android platforms.  Most applications are available for 
                     
12 Army Blue Book is the new recruit reference issued to all basic 
trainees that provides information on Army culture, history and 
regulations (TRADOC PAM 600-4, 2008). 
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download on both the iTunes App Store and the Android 
Marketplace. Apps for the Army (A4A) also created a 
repository for the applications submitted, along with 
instructions on development techniques, and SDK links on the 
Army Marketplace website, which is accessible only by DoD 
CAC13 holders. An image of the site is shown in Figure 14. 
CSDA proved how effective their methods are in the recent 
A4A challenge sponsored by the Army CIO/G-6.  
 







                     
13 CAC (Common Access Card) or more commonly known as the Smart Card, 
enables the user to encrypt and cryptographically sign e-mails, 
facilitating the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to establish 
secure online connections (CAC, 2011). 
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The A4A Challenge was the Army’s first internal 
application development challenge. From March 1, 2010, to 
May 15, 2010, 53 applications were developed and submitted 
by personnel from all across the Army, both active duty and 
civilian. A4A demonstrated how crucial the integration of 
the warfighter is toward a successful rapidly developed 
application.  
c. FIST 
Another successful effort to develop and integrate 
a smartphone application came From Marine Captain Carrick T. 
Longley. His effort was to develop the Field Information 
Support Tool (FIST) system. FIST incorporated the power of a 
COTS smartphone and the availability of SDKs to create a 
software application, Collect, and tie the handheld device 
running his software application into an information 
management server known as FusionPortal. The information 
gathered from Collect and other intelligence databases was 
then processed and displayed in a usable form through 
FusionView software (Longley, 2010). The FIST architecture 
is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15.   Diagram of the FIST components and its 
overall architecture (From Longley, 2010). 
The FIST was designed as an intelligence 
collection tool that could be used in scenarios and 
operations varying from Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) 
to humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) 
(Longley, 2010). Longley’s developmental efforts were 
successful in the creation of the Collect application and 
the integration of the smartphone to address a capability 
gap that exists with the inherent latency involved in 
intelligence fusion operations. It is this tie-in to 
existing systems that SMART Fires must emulate to ultimately 
provide the functionality required to enhance a warfighting 
capability. 
B. SELECTION OF THE ANDROID PLATFORM 
The top four current smartphones OSs are: Google’s 
Android OS, Research In Motion (RIM) from BlackBerry, 
Apple’s iPhone OS, and Microsoft’s Windows Phone OS, as 
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shown in Figure 16. According to the information in the 
chart, only the Android platform is increasing as far as the 
user base. The IPhone market-share appears somewhat flat. 
The Android platform was selected as the target platform for 
this proof-of-concept. It was selected for the following 
reasons: 
1) The growing popularity of the Android OS potentially 
translates to an increased user intuition toward SMART Fires 
usage. This increased familiarity results in decreased 
training requirements for the users to interact with the 
application on an Android device. Thus, new users will not 
require dedicated familiarization training on the SMART 
Fires platform, as is currently the case for AFTADS, due to 
pre-existing knowledge about the Android OS.  
 
 
Figure 16.   U.S. Smartphone Market Share by OS from 
February 2010 through January 2011 (From Goldman, 
2011). 
2) Android SDKs are available for development on any of 
the top three personal computing operating systems: Windows, 
Apple, or Linux. Android’s developmental environment was 
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available at no cost to the user in a variety of SDKs and 
IDEs, all of which allowed for rapid testing and 
implementation on any smartphone running the Android OS 
without having to purchase either a new computer or learn a 
new computing environment.14 
3) The iPhone development would require the use of the 
iPhone SDK that runs on MAC OS X and the Xcode integrated 
development environment (IDE) (Apple Inc., 2011). This would 
have required a relatively large time investment to learn a 
new computing OS and would have slowed the overall 
development efforts toward the SMART Fires application 
prototype. 
4) The SMART Fires prototype was based on the primary 
researcher’s exposure to the capabilities for Android 
development during the Wireless Mobile Computing15 course 
offered at NPS. In two months, the class collectively 
integrated (onto a smartphone running the Android OS) an 
application that enabled use of all communication methods 
resident in the smartphone’s hardware. This same type of 
communication hardware usage is envisioned for the future 
development of the SMART Fires application. 
The Android architecture provides the best use of a 
smartphone’s capabilities. Simply put, development using an 
                     
14 The author’s primary computing experience is with Windows-based 
computing systems. 
15 The wireless mobile computing class laid a foundation for 
understanding the inner workings of commercial GSM cellular networks. 
The class project required the use of a commercial cellular device that 
would provide emergency first responders with voice, video feed, chat, 
and e-mail. The prototype was meant only to demonstrate the capabilities 
that exist on the smartphone and how very few times they are all 
realized to their full potential. 
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Android enables greater functional use of the smartphone 
because of Android’s open-source nature. Developers for 
Android routinely leverage the devices’ internal components 
to their full capacity. These efforts seem stifled in IPhone 
OS. Additionally, the Android social networking for 
developers provides support forums for the exploration of 
the Android environment. These open forums serve as a venue 
for peer-review and enhanced collaboration, much the same as 
for the LINUX OS. 
Linux is a key component of the Android architecture, 
and Android is the product of the Open Handset Alliance 
(OHA). The OHA is a business alliance dedicated to the open 
development of mobile handsets, enabling the developers to 
implement new technologies as they emerge and providing 
consumers an evolving, richer experience. OHA accomplished 
this by providing developers open access to the hardware and 
the source code in the Android architecture (Open Handset 
Alliance, 2011). 
C. ANDROID ARCHITECTURE  
Shown in Figure 17 is an illustration of the Android 
architecture. The basic Android architecture is composed of 
four stacked layers. The layers are examined from the 
bottom-up to demonstrate the applications’ interaction with 
the physical hardware on the smartphone that is offered 
uniquely by the Android OS. These layers are: the Linux 




Figure 17.   Android operating system architecture (From 
Borenstein, 2008).  
1. Linux Kernel 
The Linux Kernel16 is the base stack and it is what the 
Android architecture uses to interface the applications to 
the device’s hardware, i.e., the processor, memory, RAM or 
peripheral devices. The Linux Kernel is the base component 
for the rest of the Android OS and also provides core system 
services, including security, for memory and processor 
management (Android, 2011). 
                     
16 Linux Kernel is an operating system released under the GNU Public 
License version 2 (GPLv2). Linux was created by a Finnish computer 
science student, Linus Torvalds, in 1991. It is a prominent example of 
the free and open source software development environments.(IBM, 2011).  
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2a. Libraries  
The next component of the software stack is the 
Libraries. The Libraries component contains C/C++17 compiled 
code libraries that provide capabilities, or systems 
utilities, to the application stack through Application 
Framework (Android, 2011). The main libraries are: 
• System C Library provides support for internal C 
or C++ code execution 
• Media Libraries support playback and recording of 
various audio, video, and still image formats 
• Surface Manager manages the display and composites 
2D and 3D layers from the applications 
• LibWebCore is a modern web browser engine 
• SQLite, a relational database engine 
The Libraries component of the stack also contains the 
Android Runtime component.  
2b. Android Runtime 
Android Runtime includes libraries for the Java18 
programming language. In the Android architecture, every 
application runs in its own virtual machine19 (VM). This 
                     
17 C/C++ are both languages in the C family of programming languages, 
originally developed for the Unix OS. C was the original language and 
C++ is a more powerful general purpose subset of the C language that 
better facilitates ease of use by the programmer (Cprogramming.com, 
2011).  
18 Java is the programming language developed by James Gosling at Sun 
Microsystems. Similar to C and C++, Java uses a simpler object model 
that enables Java applications to run on any Java Virtual Machine (JVM) 
and remain platform agnostic (Oracle, 2011). Compatible platforms 
provide a translation tool—an interpreter—that accepts each compiled 
Java statement (instruction)—or byte-code—and produces the necessary 
machine-level instructions to execute that statement.  
19 Virtual Machine, or virtual device, is an emulation of hardware or 
software configurations modeled on existing hardware or software 
(Android, 2011).  
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separation of software from hardware by a VM allows 
applications written in Java to remain platform agnostic. 
The instance of VM within which the application runs is not 
a Java VM (JVM). Java applications typically run in a JVM on 
a desktop or laptop computer because there is less concern 
for preserving power and processing consumption. In Android 
Runtime, the applications run in their own instance of a 
Dalvik VM,20 This VM provides optimum performance on 
platforms, like a smartphone, that are constrained by 
limited power and processor speeds (Borenstein, 2008). 
3. Application Framework 
The Application Framework is a set of services and 
systems that include: 
• Views, which can be used to build applications by 
organizing the GUI. This includes lists, grids, 
text boxes, buttons, and web browser embedding; 
• Content Manager to provide access to data from 
other applications and sharing of internal data; 
• Resource Manager that enables access to non-code 
resources, such as strings, graphics and layouts; 
• Notification Manager to enable custom display of 
alerts by applications; and 
• Activity Manager to manage the lifecycle of 
running applications. 
The Application Framework, an open development 
platform, offers the environment for developers to build 
rich innovative applications. These innovative applications 
can then take full advantage of the smartphone platform 
                     
20 Dalvik is a process VM written by Dan Bornstein that enables Java 
code to run on a slow CPU with relatively little RAM, on an OS without 
swap space, while powered by a battery (Borenstein, 2008).  
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through the use of SDKs to access the full framework APIs 
used by the core applications (Android, 2011). 
4. Applications 
Applications provide the interface to the user for the 
platform. In this regard, the programmer develops an 
application with the GUI to harness the capabilities of the 
device that enhances the user’s experience. These 
applications for Android are written by the developer in 
Java.  
We next discuss our analysis in pairing smartphone 
capabilities to user requirements to determine how well 
these requirements are met.  
D. ANDROID-TO-USER REQUIRMENTS ANALYSIS 
To demonstrate how Android can best support the 
requirements of the SMART Fires application user, we must 
first establish the user’s requirements. The SMART Fires 
application is envisioned for the entry level user: Fire 
Support Man (MOS–0861). Requirements for this user are 
defined in this analysis as the required tasks to be 
performed in combat. All artillery Marines are assigned 
tasks they are individually required to perform in combat 
according to Marine Corps Order 3501.26A, also known as the 
Marine Corps Artillery Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual. 
We conducted this analysis with the list of the required 
tasks for the E-1 Private MOS-0861 Fire Support Man 
according to this T&R manual.  
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1. Fire Support Man METL 
The task list, known as the Mission Essential Task List 
(METL), is segmented into several categories referred to as 
duty areas.21 There are seven duty areas for Fire Support, 
of which six apply to the proficiency of the entry level 
fire support man. The duty areas are numbered sequentially; 
however, Duty Area 06 is not within the scope of this 
analysis. Therefore, this research is concerned with Duty 
Areas 01 through 05 and Duty Area 07. The Duty Areas are as 
follows: 
• Duty Area 01–Map Reading and M2 Compass 
• Duty Area 02–Communications 
• Duty Area 03–Observed Fire Procedures 
• Duty Area 04–Fire Support Planning and 
Coordination 
• Duty Area 05–Counterfire22 
• Duty Area 07–Observer Digital Terminal 
These duty areas comprise the Mission Essential Tasks 
(MET). METs are further differentiated into two types, Core 
and Core Plus. Core tasks are essential individual tasks 
that support the warfighting function for the unit. Core 
Plus tasks are situation dependant to the warfighting 
function of the unit when assigned specialized missions or 
duties (Goldman, 2010). An example of a Core versus a Core 
Plus task is: 
Duty Area 03-Observed Fire Procedures 
                     
21 Duty areas are extracted from (MCO 3501.26A, 2000) and the excerpt 
of the specific tasks required for MOS 0861, Private through Lance 
Corporal, is provided in Appendix H. 
22 Counterfire is “fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy 
indirect fire capability” (MCWP 3-16, 1999). 
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• Core Task: 0861.03.01 – Select an observation post 
and prepare to use it. 
• Core Plus Task: 0861.03.42 - Direct a Close Air 
Support (CAS) strike. 
2. Smartphone Assistance for METs 
The scope of this project was to develop and 
demonstrate a prototype SMART Fires application that focused 
on the Core Tasks for the entry level MOS 0861. A table was 
created to demonstrate the amount of assistance an Android 
device running the SMART Fires application could provide to 
the user to accomplish the Core METs. These Core METs became 
the basis of the SMART Fires application requirements. 
a. Smartphone Features 
The standard smartphone is equipped with several 
hardware components that provide the Smart capability. These 









• Large Touch Display 
• Accessible Compact-Flash Storage 
• Large internal Memory enabling video significant 
processing 
• Capable Processor, most are now 1 GHz or greater 
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These features were used as a basis for evaluation of 
the functional support to the user’s MET. 
b. Evaluation of Support 
The evaluation of support to the Core METs was 
done from two perspectives assuming a fully developed SMART 
Fires application. The first perspective was how many of the 
smartphone features were utilized in accomplishing any 
portion of the MET; this perspective was categorized as 
feature utilization. The second perspective, and most 
important to the study, was how well accomplishing the MET 
was supported; this perspective was categorized as MET 
support.  
A determination was made as to whether or not each 
smartphone feature could provide support for each MET; if 
the answer was yes, the feature was awarded a one, if the 
answer was no, the feature received nothing. The total 
points were added together for each MET and the sum divided 
by the number of smartphone features. This quotient 
reflected the percentage of the smartphone features utilized 
for that MET. This process was repeated for all METs. Then 
the average for all Core METs was taken by Duty Area, and an 
average of 70 percent utilization was discovered. This 
demonstrated to the researchers that most of the smartphones 
features provide benefit to the user in enabling the 
performance of the Core tasks. The most important question 
however, is how well a fully developed SMART Fires 
application on a smartphone would support the user in 
accomplishing their Core tasks. 
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To determine the level of support to the METs the 
researchers assumed an ordinal scale that corresponded to 
the level of support provided by a fully developed SMART 
Fires application.  
• If a MET was not supported in any way the 
SMART Fires application received a zero.  
• If the MET was minimally supported the SMART 
Fires application received a one.  
• If the MET was mostly supported the SMART 
Fires application received a 2.  
• If the MET was fully supported, meaning the 
entire task could be accomplished using only 
the application, then it received a three.  
Then the average for all Core METs was taken by 
Duty Area, and an average of 2.0, mostly supported, was 
discovered. Also key to the evaluation of support is the 
fact that there was no Core Task that was not at least 
minimally supported. The average utilization and MET Support 














 Map Reading & M2 Compass 80% 1.8 
02 
Communications 70% 1.9 
03 
Observed Fire Procedures 88% 2.6 
07 
Observer Digital Terminal 43% 1.6 
ALL CORE METs 70% 2.0 
Table 2.   The table presents a summary of smartphone 
utilization and support to the Core METs by 
Duty Area. 
These figures informed the researchers that a 
fully developed SMART Fires application would leverage a 
significant portion of the platform capabilities for fire 
support at the tactical level and it would enhance the 
user’s ability to perform every mission essential task in 
combat. In the evaluation, the utilization average was 
relatively low for Duty Area 07, Observer Digital Terminal 
(ODT), because the assumption for the evaluation was that 
the ODT was not the SMART Fires application. This assumption 
was introduced to the evaluation since the SMART Fires 
application was not yet developed when the T&R manual was 
written. This research effort considers that the best ODT 
would be a fully developed SMART Fires application. As proof 
of this belief, if the ODT were assumed to be the SMART 
Fires application the utilization and MET Support average 
would have increased from 72 percent to 76 percent 
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utilization and 2.0 to 2.1 MET Support. Comparison of the 
utilization and MET support provided by the SMART Fires 
application for Core Tasks is provided in Appendix I and for 
the Core Plus tasks in Appendix J. 
E. RAPID DEVELOPMENT DEFINED  
We began rapid development of the SMART Fires 
application prototype by establishing requirements. The 
underlying premise for the proof-of-concept study was that a 
user could aid in the rapid development of the prototype 
application that could then be provided to the operating 
forces, enhancing warfighter capability. To demonstrate this 
we first needed to discover what user input would be most 
beneficial to the developer.  
1. User Involvement 
Software development for mobile applications in 
particular is still in its infancy when contrasted with 
software development in general that started in the late 
1960s and has been around for more than 50 years (Osmundson, 
2011). Traditionally, a software developer is not in the 
military operating forces. The developer relies on past 
personal experience and/or the advice of systems engineers 
and software developers for how to best satisfy requirements 
– usually to the detriment of the user.  
Often the software developer satisfies internal 
production requirements at a higher priority than the users’ 
requirements. It is essential that detailed requirements be 
given to the developer to create software that fulfills the 
user’s needs. Therein lies the problem with traditional 
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development methods: users are seldom capable of 
articulating the software requirements.  
User requirements are difficult to articulate, in part 
because the user does not have an in depth knowledge of the 
capabilities of the system platform for which the developer 
will create the software application, may not exist. This is 
not generally the case in smartphone application 
development; the user and the developer both have a detailed 
knowledge of the platform and interface. The introduction of 
the user as a partner in development is what will be 
exploited in the SMART Fires application prototype.  
We argue that that by adapting existing software 
development practices to the development of a smartphone 
application, the development time could be decreased and a 
fielded product provided to the warfighter sooner. An 
examination of current prototyping is required to understand 
how it was adapted. 
a. Rapid Application Development 
There exists an industry accepted methodology for 
prototyping in software development known as Rapid 
Application Development (RAD) (Christensen & Thayer, 2001). 
The process takes place in a cycle with three steps. The 
cycle begins with the user’s, or customer’s (in the business 
case), provided requirements for the prototype. Next, the 
developer builds the prototype based on these requirements. 
The cycle’s last step is the prototype usage by the 
customer. The cycle runs full course when inputs from the 
customer on the prototype are provided to the developer as 
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subsequent requirements for the prototype (Osmundson, 2011). 
An illustration is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   The Rapid Application Development Cycle (From 
Osmundson, 2011). 
We remain convinced that the strength of user 
inputs to the application did not fully reveal the complete 
benefit to the RAD cycle until the second time the developer 
“listened” to the user as illustrated in Figure 18. This 
meant lost time to the development process. The answer to 
reduce this lost development time would be to introduce high 
value input requirements when initiating the cycle. 
b. Rapid Development for Applications 
There are two key differences between the user of 
the current call-for-fire system and the SMART Fires user. 
The first difference is the previous experience with the 
application platform, an Android™ smartphone. The second 
difference is how the user expected to interact with the 
SMART Fires GUI. The unique benefit of the user in rapid 
development for applications is that the user provides a 
visualization of a GUI intuitive for the user that serves as 
a framework for the application requirements and interface. 
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The developer can then provide a prototype that meets user 
needs in one cycle with only minor changes required on any 
subsequent cycles. This rapid development for applications 
technique can result in a developer creating an application 
the user already knows how to employ. Unfortunately for the 
operating forces, this familiarity with new systems is the 
exception. 
Fielding of fire support systems in recent history 
has relied on New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) to provide 
the users with the minimum requisite knowledge to introduce 
a new capability to the unit. It then is incumbent on the 
military commands to develop and institutionalize formal 
courses and recommended on-the-job training practices to 
gain the full benefit of a new system fielded23. Our rapid 
application development technique can reduce this lag in 
operational enhancement to the warfighter.  
The user for SMART Fires needed to convey their 
requirements to the developer in a form that benefits the 
development of the application as quickly as possible. The 
information required to go into the application was the same 
as for the standard CFF. Thus, the standard CFF, provided in 
Appendix A, was used as the basis of information that a user 
would be required to input into SMART Fires.  
The author’s experience provided a thorough 
understanding of voice procedures to submit the CFF. The 
inputs to the CFF were known to be required inputs into the 
SMART Fires application before a CFF could be submitted 
                     
23 Based on the author’s experience while serving as a Battery 
Commander and the Regimental Logistics Officer during the fielding of 
two new weapon systems and the planning for the fielding of a third. 
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using the new application. Many inputs could be extracted 
directly from the Android smartphone functions and could be 
provided to the user: location, observer identification, and 
identification of the firing unit. Yet, the target location 
and description would change for most targets. The strength 
of the Android development is the ability for an application 
to take information from other C2 systems; information such 
as other friendly unit locations, suspected enemy locations, 
or known enemy activity helps facilitate a more informed 
decision by the observer.  
c. App-boards 
The Appboards technique was derived from how 
movies and animated films are first presented to the 
writers, cinematographers, or detailed animators, referred 
to commonly as story-boards. Story-board artists use roughly 
drawn still images of key scenes to present to the rest of 
the staff or development team a vision of the finished 
product. Story-boards have also previously been used in 
development of user interfaces for other software 
applications by IBM (IBM, 2011). This technique was adapted 
to the development of the SMART Fires application by 
creating App-boards.  
App-boards are hand-drawn, roughly illustrated 
screen captures of the application being designed. The app-
boards provide a vision of the application that makes sense 
to the user, and through the use of screen numbering and the 
notes section, the user can write down what functionality is 
required. The app-boards can be as detailed or as generic as 
the user and developer jointly determine necessary to convey 
the concept being depicted. The app-boards can be as 
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detailed as including interfaces buttons, pull down menus, 
settings button etc. An illustration of the app-board is 
shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   Example of App-board worksheet. 
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There are various forms of this type of product in 
the Android development communities and forums. These 
products are usually referred to as “wireframes.” The 
wireframe drawing is then used to create a design for the 
prospective Android application. Tools that exist for 
wireframing range from hardcopy graphic-document, with a 
phone display silhouette like the app-board, to a 
downloadable software package that can be used as stand-
alone software or in conjunction with an IDE, such as the 
Eclipse™ SDK.  
In this proof-of-concept study, the user was 
assumed to be familiar with the use of a smartphone and not 
expected to be involved in actual Java programming or 
required to interact with the Eclipse™ IDE. For these 
reasons, the app-boards provided the fastest method for 
communication of the user’s vision of the prototype. The 
developer could now commence work on the prototype with the 
user’s vision communicated, moving the research efforts one 
step closer to the SMART Fires application.  
F. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The Eclipse™ development tool has been mentioned as an 
SDK and now an IDE for Android Development but it can be 
used for much more. Provided is a description of Eclipse and 
its capabilities along with how the other required software 
components tie in for Android development. The first step to 
setup of the development computer was installing the Java 
Development Kit (JDK). 
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1. JDK 
On the Oracle website for Java development there are 
several options for download in order to begin development. 
All the software downloaded from the Oracle website was 
available at no charge. The Java Runtime Environment (JRE), 
required for Java applications and applets, is also required 
for Android development, as is the Java Development Kit 
(JDK). There are several open source versions of both the 
JRE and JDK available however this research effort selected 
the JRE and JDK from Oracle. Without a version of the JRE 
and JDK installed the IDE selected for development could not 
use the Java language for its software, since it is the JRE 
and JDK that allow for the respective running and writing of 
the Java programming language (Oracle, 2011).  
Java does provide its own Java IDE, NetBeans™, which 
provides most of the same functionality as the Eclipse IDE. 
The Eclipse IDE, however, is widely supported in 
documentation and, specifically, in the Commonsware© 
reference library used by the researchers. The support 
aspect weighed heavily in the decision to begin development 
with the Eclipse™ IDE. Accordingly, the next step toward 
development was to download the Eclipse™ IDE.  
2. Eclipse™ IDE 
The Eclipse™ integrated development environment began 
as a not-for-profit corporation that furthered open source 
software development. Eclipse is provided free of charge for 
public or commercial development. The infrastructure, 
maintained at no charge to developers, includes: code 
repositories, databases, mailing lists and newsgroups, and 
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the website front end that enables downloads of the Eclipse™ 
software (Eclipse Foundation, 2011). The Eclipse software 
supports development in a variety of programming languages 
in addition to Java. These other programming languages 
include: AspectJ, C and C++, COBOL, and PHP. Eclipse offers 
IDEs for these languages on the three big personal computing 
OS: Windows, Linux and MAC. The other main feature of using 
the Eclipse environment is the additional tools and builds 
and plug-ins available to enhance developmental efforts. The 
additional tools include: tester toolkits, Google plug-in 
(that include the Android Development Tools (ADT), and over 
1000 more tools (Eclipse Foundation, 2011).  
The Android Development website specifically recommends 
the use of the Eclipse IDE with the ADT plug-in for 
developers new to Android (Android, 2011). The researchers’ 
exposure to the mobile computing application development 
provided exposure to the Mark Murphy CommonsWare© library of 
resources. The use of Eclipse is not required to follow the 
examples provided in the CommonsWare© tutorials and lesson 
examples; however, the lessons were significantly easier to 
understand and implement when using the same IDE as the 
reference. Eclipse™ was most appropriate for the development 
of our SMART Fires prototype. The steps to download were 
straight forward and simple to follow from the Eclipse 
website.  
3. Android SDK Starter 
After installing JDK and the Eclipse IDE, next comes 
the Android SDK starter package with Android Development 
Tools (ADT) and an emulator, the Android Virtual Device 
(AVD). The AVD allows development without a physical 
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smartphone by use of an emulated Android smartphone to test 
and trouble-shoot the application being developed. Again, 
all software downloaded from the Android developer website 
was available free of charge and on the three main personal 
computing OS choices.  
4. ADT Plug-in for Eclipse 
The ADT plug-in for the Eclipse™ IDE allows access to 
the ADT and the AVD software directly when running Eclipse. 
During the setup for the plug-in the developer is required 
to select the platforms and APIs used in development and the 
ADT downloads those APIs for use. These APIs and tools allow 
full functionality for development and trouble-shooting 
directly from within the Eclipse workspace, so familiarity 
with a new platform is not required.  
G. CREATING WITH COMMONWARES REFERENCE 
The Android Development reference material written by 
Mark Murphy and the CommonsWare(LLC) community enabled this 
research effort to develop the SMART Fires Application 
through a paid warescription to the CommonsWare online 
library (CommonsWare, 2011). The warescription provides four 
books, viewable with any web browser in three formats, Adobe 
Acrobat, Amazon’s Kindle, and Electronic Publication (EPUB), 
the latter being an open standard for electronic readers and 
some web browsers. The warescription included free version 
updates for the duration of the warescription, online office 
hours with Mark Murphy via a chat room connection, private 
consulting (at additional cost), source code for all 
tutorials, and access to in-person training through locally 
hosted workshops. 
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The CommonsWare materials were purchased by the 
researchers at a relatively minimal cost of $40. The return 
on the researcher’s investment was reduced time in the 
learning of a new programming language. The time expended 
the prototype development was also reduced, adding to the 
return-on-investment for the CommonsWare material, since the 
texts provide examples and tutorials using the Eclipse IDE. 
There were a variety of other products available, too, such 
as written texts and videos, the latter available at no 
charge via YouTube(LLC). The products however, did not 
include the interaction with the Eclipse IDE in the depth 
that was covered in the CommonsWare© reference library. The 
research effort was greatly assisted through the use of this 
resource and as such it is recommended as a reference for 
individual learning or augmentation to formal coursework.  
With a design and development methodology and capacity 
established, the requirements and GUI design for the SMART 
Fires application prototype can be addressed. The next 
chapter describes the design and resulting implementation of 
this smartphone-based CFF tool.  
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IV. SMART FIRES DESIGN 
The App-boards created during the design process that 
consolidated user requirements and an initial GUI design are 
provided below. The chapter further provides the GUIs 
created by the researchers according to the app-boards laid 
out for the SMART Fires application prototype. 
A. DESIGN PLAN  
The design plan for the SMART Fires application 
prototype consisted of, first, allowing the user to create 
the app-boards to enable the developer to understand the 
user’s requirements and translate them into application 
processes. The processes can then be programmed and 
integrated with an appropriate GUI design, as the user 
conveyed in the app-boards.  
1. Requirement to Processes 
The app-boards, created by the user, describe the 
anticipated layout, the expected interface behaviors, and 
the requirements for the application based on warfighting 
experience. The SMART Fires application prototype is aligned 
to the user requirements, as shown in the SMART Fires 
application process depicted in Table 3. Table 3 does not 
contain requirements for Duty Areas 04 and 05 because these 
areas do not contain any Core METs. This process is modeled 
after the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 




research by Geoffrey Thome. His research explored the 
systems integration of AFATDS and the Information Operations 
Server (IOS) (Thome, 2002). 
 
Duty Area User Requirements SMART Fires process 
01 
Map Reading & 
M2 Compass 





• Receive current 
battlefield FSCMs 














• Establish comms 
• Manage Alerts 
• Auto-Forward CFF 
• Broadcast position 
 
• Provide simultaneous 






• Maintain accurate 
























• Perform FSCM checks 
• Determine recommended 
fires support agency 
• Format CFF info into 
any digital format 
• Transmit the CFF in 
format acceptable to 
any fire support agency 
• Receive MTO 
• Conduct subsequent 
corrections 







• Maintain digital user 
manuals and references for 
special equipment or 
procedures (Core Plus 
tasks) 
 
• Access local or cloud 
storage for interactive 
learning 
• Voice recognition 
searches 
 
Table 3.   User requirements translated into process 
requirements by Duty Area (After Thome, 2002). 
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2. User GUI Design 
The app-boards are reviewed to illustrate the user’s 
inputs for GUI design. The inputs captured in app-boards 1-5 
directly contribute to the observer process depicted in 
Savvion™ To-Be model presented in Figure 10. The MTO 
received from the artillery battery will populate screen 11 
in app-board 6. Screen 12 on app-board 6 and all of app-
board 7 are not depicted in the Savvion™ model. 
Specifically, we noted the following for user design: 
• App-board 1, provided in Figure 20, shows the 
startup screen and what the application should do  
to facilitate the CFF.  
• App-board 2, provided in Figure 21, illustrates 
the menu screen and selection of the firing agency 
when initializing the application.  
• App-board 3, provided in Figure 22, is the input 
screen for the fire support coordination agency in 
the CFF process and the CFF screen to initiate a 
fire mission.  
• App-board 4, presented in Figure 23, represents 
how the user expects to interact with the SMART 
Fires application to input the firing agency and 
observer identification, parts 1 and 2 of the CFF.  
• App-board 5, provided in Figure 24, illustrates 
the description of the target screen and parts 2 
and 3 of the CFF.  
• App-board, 6 provided in Figure 25, illustrates 
the MTO screen that the user will receive when the 
firing agency processes their CFF, and the 
subsequent corrections screen for adjustments by 
active targets.  
• App-board 7, provided in Figure 26, illustrates 
the user’s design for the termination of the CFF 
known as Record as Target, Refine, End of Mission, 
Surveillance (RREMS), and the transmit screen for 
a completed CFF. 
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Figure 20.   App-board 1 is the application start-up 
screen and application initialization menu. 
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Figure 21.   App-board 2 is the main menu screen and 
firing agency selection screen. 
 76 
 
Figure 22.   App-board 3 is the screen to input the fire 




Figure 23.   App-board 4 shows parts one and two of the 
four CFF screens.  
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Figure 24.   App-board 5 shows parts three and four of the 
four CFF screens. 
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Figure 25.   App-board 6 illustrates the MTO screen, and 
the subsequent corrections screen. 
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Figure 26.   App-board 7 illustrates the RREMS screen, and 
the remaining screen element for screen #12 in 
Figure 25. 
B. SMART FIRES PROTOTYPE GUI 
Using the development environment created as described 
in Chapter III, we easily translated the app-boards into  
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screenshots for the user to validate and provide feedback 
according to the rapid development for application 
technique.  
An example of the GUI created from these app-boards is 
shown here in Figure 27. The final GUIs created during this 
development are provided in Appendix K. 
 
Figure 27.   These screenshots from the SMART Fires 
application prototype correspond to the app-board 
created by the user in Figure 20. 
The SMART Fires application developed herein 
demonstrated both the utility of the Android-based 
smartphone as a platform for hosting custom combat-relevant 
applications and the effectiveness of the rapid prototyping 
for application development methodology in generating such 
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applications. The final chapter will review the intent of 
this research effort along with its findings and 




V. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the answers to the questions that 
guided this research through analysis of the results of the 
proof-of-concept study. We also present the conclusions as 
to the validity of the SMART Fires application and the way 
ahead for further development of the SMART Fires 
application. Then, once fully developed, the chapter 
describes how SMART Fires can lead to a product line of 
SMART applications that provide warfighters with enhanced 
combat capability across many, and perhaps all, functional 
areas. 
A. RESULTS 
The extent of the results from this proof-of-concept 
study is easily measured by stipulating how well the 
research questions were answered in the course of the 
effort. The questions presented in Chapter I are provided 
for ease of review. 
• How can COTS software developmental tools be used 
to produce a smartphone application to aid the 
transition between traditional radio equipment and 
a tactical cellular network?   
• How does the SMART Fires application fit into 
existing and future Command and Control platforms 
in integrating information into a Common Tactical 
Picture (CTP) that will assist the warfighter?  
• How effective will these COTS applications be in 
aiding the warfighter (e.g., target location 
precision, request latency, situational awareness 
increases, and efficiency)? 
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1. TRANSITION TO TACTICAL CELLULAR NETWORK. 
This first research question is a two-step process 
addressed first by providing specific C2 functions commonly 
resident only at the battalion and higher levels to the 
company, and in some cases, to the individual Marine. In 
keeping with the CAPSET 5 UNS by Hastings, there exists a 
need now for these C2 functions by the Company-level units 
and below (Hastings, 2009).  
By developing applications that run on the smartphone 
platform, we fulfill that need. This will facilitate the 
second part of the answer regarding transitioning to a 
tactical cellular network, which is the bandwidth 
requirement levied by providing this C2 capability down to 
the USMC company-level and below. This need requires an 
improved communications network, one previously unused by 
the military, namely a tactical cellular network. To gain 
full C2 capability at the company, smartphone systems will 
be required to access information resident with the legacy 
systems of record. This information can no longer remain 
stove-piped in proprietary systems. The tactical smartphone 
integration can be aided by demonstrating how these legacy 
platforms may be integrated into a tactical cellular 
network.  
2. ASSIST THE WARFIGHTER IN INTEGRATING COMMON 
TACTICAL PICTURE (CTP) 
The Android-based GD300, tested at the Army experiment 
discussed in Chapter II, was tested with the Tactical Ground 
Reporting (TIGR) application. TIGR provides near-real time 
C2 at the individual soldier-level, similar to the Blue 
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Force Tracker (BFT) providing position of friendly vehicles 
and CP locations in the Army’s Force Battle 21 Command for 
the Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The TIGR application, if 
loaded onto the smartphone, could provide the observer 
instant, accurate positions of friendly maneuver units in 
his area of operations. The BFT provides a near-real time 
position location for tactical forces. This information is 
an example of the integration possible by the SMART Fires 
application. We envision a similar functionality to that of 
Google Maps where information is filtered so as not to 
overwhelm the user as the map scale is increased. Lower 
level units and individuals might become visible as the map 
is scaled down to a focused area of responsibility. This 
information feed — focused to the area with which the user 
is concerned — is the best example of how, when integrated 
on the tactical cellular network or tethered into the C2 
network, SMART Fires can enhance the user’s Common Tactical 
Picture.  
3. EFFECTIVE COTs DEVELOPED APPLICATIONS 
The development of a SMART product line of applications 
for smartphones will provide the assistance demonstrated 
through the Savvion™ business model in Chapter II. The 
results of the model indicated that the overall efficiency 
of a unit with integrated SMART applications could prosecute 
ten times the number of CFF in the same amount of time as a 
unit without the applications.  
This efficiency in execution was directly related to 
the observer’s ability to tie in information from the 
existing C2 systems like Blue Force Tracker (BFT), which is 
the end system for FBCB2 (Dixon, 2009). This same product 
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line of “SMART” applications can be designed for every 
warfighting function: SMART Intel, SMART Logistics, etc. A 
product line of SMART applications could be developed once 
the SMART APIs are made available for development similar to 
the way developers create applications to interact with open 
source APIs. These APIs range from Google Maps to Banking 
APIs. Development is constrained by the imagination of the 
user community with respect to how their requirements might 
be addressed by smartphone-based applications. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored the impact that smartphone-based 
applications can have on the warfighter. The focus of the 
proof-of-concept was to rapidly design an application, 
leveraging user experience with C2 programs of record 
systems, i.e., AFATDS, Command and Control Personal Computer 
(C2PC), Global Command and Control System — Marine Corps 
(GCCS-MC), to enhance the Call-for-Fire process executed by 
very junior Marines.  
Such integration efforts for a military smartphone 
technology are ongoing. This is the time to begin 
development of applications that provide the warfighter 
enhanced warfighting capability. The SMART Fires Application 
can have a positive, immediate impact on the warfighter’s 
mobility and lethality. It is in this integrated Smartphone 
—military tactical network environment—that the rapidly 
developable Smartphone applications can provide a positive 
impact to all warfighting functions throughout the Marine 
Corps and eventually the joint services.  
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the course of this research, various activities were 
beyond the scope established for the proof-of-concept study. 
Those activities should be considered as recommendations 
toward the completion of the SMART Fires application 
prototype.  
1. AFTADS Integration 
The next step for the SMART Fires application is to 
complete the integration into the existing fire support 
network. The CFF from SMART Fires requires conversion into 
the Variable Message Format (VMF) for transmission to the 
AFATDS. This task presented a level of complication and 
technical expertise that was beyond the scope of this 
research. Through further development, however, the SMART 
Fires prototype could gain the required functionality and 
integration with existing fire support C2 systems as 
required by the warfighter. Such would mean SMART Fires 
could transmit a CFF directly to AFATDS when tethered to a 
COF network radio. 
2. Use of Augmented Reality 
Some existing android market applications integrate an 
emerging technology known as Augmented Reality (AR). AR uses 
the smartphone framework of an integrated position indicator 
and accelerometer to provide a graphical overlay for the 
device’s display that presents relevant information to the 




altitude, etc. The closest AR application that matches the 
display, as envisioned by the researchers, is from Hunter 




Figure 28.   The Theodolite PRO AR screen provides a 
variety of positional and directional information 
for the user (From Hunter Research & Technology, 
2011) 
We envision that the primary use for AR would be in 
providing a visual reference of critical information in the 
display. AR can be used in a military application to present 
a known location of a target site that the user could 
readily distinguish on the display. This AR function could 
assist the user to verify the true target location very 
quickly, helping to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.  
D. FUTURE WORK. 
The SMART Fires application prototype could benefit the 
fire-support community immediately with increased efficiency 
in transmitting a CFF in any format or standard required. 
Future work for the SMART Fires application could establish 
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a SMART API for a Product Line Architecture (PLA) of 
applications to increase sharing of the users’ CTP so that 
users of sister SMART applications can provide logistics, 
intelligence, force protection, or other information 
pertinent to the warfighting functionalities required for 
the user’s success. An increase in the user’s accuracy and 
precision in target location could also be provided. 
Finally, a SMART Simulator could further extend the training 
environment for our users.  
1. SMART Product Line Architecture 
The Android-based operating system used on the GD300 
was reported to be released to the public for developmental 
efforts in July 2011. The warfighter could maintain the 
status quo and continue to carry more equipment and systems 
than he should because the system providers continue to 
create new proprietary devices. The most advantageous 
aspects of smartphone integration into the military wireless 
network are that smartphones provide a PLA approach to 
tactical interfaces by standardizing the device platform. 
Once this framework is established, products will continue 
to be developed and integrated with other applications. 
Smartphone integration may also inform and standardize 
future software development because the platform has already 
been established. 
2. SMART Range Finder 
The Call-for-Fire (CFF), transmitted through the SMART 
Fires application, is dependent upon the ability of the user 
to estimate the distance to the target. While the use of map 
APIs and overlays can enhance the user’s accuracy, the human 
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factor remains involved in initial target location. To 
decrease human error, the use of a laser range-finding 
device as a part of the SMART Fires system may increase the 
likelihood of the first rounds fired having the desired 
effect on the target and could contribute toward 
conservation of ammunition. We also note that the device can 
either be tethered via wired or wireless communication with 
the smartphone or fully integrated into the hardware itself, 
such as a sleeve.  
3. SMART Simulation 
The software developed by the two Naval Postgraduate 
School students for The Forward Observer Personal Computer 
Simulator (FOPCSIM) was created to increase CFF training 
effectiveness for Marines embarked aboard naval ships. The 
realistic training simulation increased exposure to the call 
for fire process and the tasks associated with accomplishing 
the observer core tasks (Brannon & Villandre, 2002).  
Their research and creation of the this stand-alone 
program resulted in a system that was later tied into 
existing forward observer systems, to include the Training 
Set Forward Observer (TFSO), Closed Loop Artillery 
Simulation System (CLASS), Forward Observer Training 
Simulator (FOTS), GUARDFIST II, and eventually the DVTE 
where the trainer first created a virtual environment for 
training the forward observers. The integration of a 
simulation capability into the SMART Fires application, 
similar to FOPCSIM, might further enhance the warfighting 




Extracted from J-FIRE (MCRP 3-16.8B, 1997) 
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Extracted from J-FIRE (MCRP 3-16.8B, 1997) 
 
 96 










Process Time And Cost
















Computes Firing Data All member(s) of Artillery Batter 1 0:01:00 0:02:00 0:03:00
Costructs Message to Observer All member(s) of Artillery Batter 1 0:00:00 0:01:00 0:01:00
Receives Arty CFF All member(s) of Artillery Batter 1 0:00:00 0:02:00 0:02:00
Assigns Organic Fires FiSTLeader 1 0:30:00 0:01:00 0:31:00
Process CFF FiSTLeader 5 6:32:00 0:50:00 7:22:00
Requests 81mm mortars FiSTLeader 1 0:03:00 2:00:00 2:03:00
Requests Arty FiSTLeader 1 0:00:00 2:00:00 2:00:00
Requests battalion fires FiSTLeader 3 0:15:00 0:09:00 0:24:00
Requests NGF FiSTLeader 1 2:00:00 2:00:00 4:00:00
Approves 81mm mortar FSC 1 0:00:00 0:01:00 0:01:00
Approves Arty FSC 1 0:00:00 0:01:00 0:01:00
FSCC processes CFF FSC 3 0:00:00 0:06:00 0:06:00
Observer gathers target data Observer 5 0:00:00 0:05:00 0:05:00
Observer submits CFF Observer 5 0:00:00 0:25:00 0:25:00
Records MTO Observer 1 0:00:00 0:01:00 0:01:00
Resource Unit Cost/Unit # People Utilization 
Observer Hour 12 2 0%
FSC Hour 31 11 0%
FiSTLeader Hour 20 6 0%
All member(s) of Artillery Battery Hour 14.25 100 0%
Given Information
Work Week Hours = 40
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Process Time And Cost
















Approves 81 mm mortar FSC 16 0:00:00 0:08:00 0:08:00
Approves Arty FSC 55 0:00:00 0:55:00 0:55:00
Approves CAS FSC 10 0:00:00 0:20:00 0:20:00
Approves NGF FSC 1 0:00:00 0:02:00 0:02:00
Assigns organic fires Any member of FiSTLeader 10 0:00:51 0:10:00 0:10:51
Computes firing data All member(s) of Artillery Battery 55 0:02:10 0:09:10 0:11:20
FSCC processes CFF FSC 83 0:00:29 0:41:30 0:41:59
Observer gathers target datObserver 95 0:00:24 0:47:30 0:47:54
Process CFF Any member of FiSTLeader 95 0:04:08 0:47:30 0:51:38
Receives Arty CFF All member(s) of Artillery Battery 55 0:00:21 1:50:00 1:50:21
Records MTO Observer 55 0:02:09 0:00:55 0:03:04
Requests 81mm mortars Any member of FiSTLeader 19 0:00:00 0:38:00 0:38:00
Requests Arty Any member of FiSTLeader 48 0:00:05 1:36:00 1:36:05
Requests CAS Any member of FiSTLeader 15 0:00:00 0:30:00 0:30:00
Requests NGF Any member of FiSTLeader 1 0:00:00 0:02:00 0:02:00
Requests battalion fires Any member of FiSTLeader 83 0:00:30 4:09:00 4:09:30
Resource Unit Cost/Unit Threshold Usage Cost
Observer Hour 12 0 0 0
FSC Hour 31 0 2 62
Any member of FiSTLeader Hour 20 0 7 140
All member(s) of Artillery B Hour 14.25 0 218 3106.5
Performers Queue Length and Utilization
Name Average Min Max Utilized(%) Idle(%)
Observer 0.01 0 1 11.08 88.92
FSC 0 0 1 28.95 71.05
Any member of FiSTLeader 0.01 0 1 54.07 45.93








TOBE Assigns organic fires Any member of FiSTLeader 0 0 1
TOBE Computes firing data All member(s) of Artillery Battery 0 0 1
TOBE FSCC processes CFF FSC 0 0 1
TOBE Observer gathers target data Observer 0 0 1
TOBE Process CFF Any member of FiSTLeader 0.01 0 1
TOBE Receives Arty CFF All member(s) of Artillery Battery 0 0 1
TOBE Records MTO Observer 0 0 1
TOBE Requests Arty Any member of FiSTLeader 0 0 1
TOBE Requests battalion fires Any member of FiSTLeader 0 0 1
Note: Red-marked Waiting Time values indicates "Activity has waiting time"
Red-marked Usage values indicates "Usage crossed threshold"  
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APPENDIX H 
MOS 0861, FIRE SUPPORT MAN Mission Essential Tasks List 
DUTY AREA 01-MAP READING AND M2 COMPASS                                                
 
1. TASK: 0861.01.01 (CORE) DECLINATE AN M2 COMPASS USING THE FIELD 
EXPEDIENT METHOD 
 
2. TASK: 0861.01.02 (CORE) ORIENT A MAP USING A DECLINATED M2 COMPASS 
 
3. TASK: 0861.01.03 (CORE) LOCATE YOUR POSITION DURING A TERRAIN WALK 
 
4. TASK: 0861.01.04 (CORE) NAVIGATE FROM ONE POINT ON THE GROUND TO 
ANOTHER POINT, MOUNTED 
 
5. TASK: 0861.01.05 (CORE) LOCATE POSITIONS IN A MOBILE ENVIRONMENT 
 
6. TASK: 0861.01.06 (CORE) DETERMINE LOCATION WITH THE AN/GVS-5 LASER 
RANGE FINDER 
 
7. TASK: 0861.01.07 (CORE) DETERMINE LOCATION WITH THE AN/PAQ-3 MODULAR 
UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) USING TWO KNOWN POINTS                                                  
 
8. TASK: 0861.01.08 (CORE PLUS) DETERMINE LOCATION WITH THE AN/PAQ-3 
MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) USING ONE KNOWN POINT AND A 
BURST                                 
 
9. TASK: 0861.01.09 (CORE PLUS) DETERMINE LOCATION WITH THE AN/PAQ-3 
MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) USING TWO BURSTS                                                  
 
10. TASK: 0861.01.10 (CORE) DETERMINE LOCATION WITH THE AN/PAQ-3 MODULAR 
UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) USING SELF-LOCATION PROCEDURE                                           
 
11. TASK: 0861.01.11 (CORE) LOCATE POSITION ON A MAP OR GROUND BY 
RESECTION 
 
12. TASK: 0861.01.12 (CORE) DETERMINE THE ELEVATION OF A POINT ON THE 
GROUND USING A MAP 
 
13. TASK: 0861.01.13 (CORE) DETERMINE A POSITION WITH THE AN/PSN-11 PLGR 
IN THE AVERAGING MODE                                                                                     
 
14. TASK: 0861.01.14 (CORE) PERFORM NAVIGATION PROCEDURES WITH THE AN/PSN-
11 PLGR 
 
15. TASK: 0861.01.15 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT BATTLEFIELD REPORTING 
 
DUTY AREA 02-COMMUNICATIONS                                                            
 
16. TASK: 0861.02.01 (CORE) ESTABLISH/ENTER AND LEAVE A RADIO TELEPHONE 
NET 
 
17. TASK: 0861.02.02 (CORE PLUS) ENCODE/DECODE/AUTHENTICATE USING THE 
NUMERAL CIPHER/AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM                                                             
 
18. TASK: 0861.02.04 (CORE) SEND AND RECEIVE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS USING 
PROPER RADIO TELEPHONE PROCEDURES                                                                     
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19. TASK: 0861.02.05 (CORE PLUS) TRANSMIT A MESSAGE UTILIZING NATO FORMAT 
 
20. TASK: 0861.02.06 (CORE PLUS) DRAFT A MESSAGE USING NATO FORMAT 
 
21. TASK: 0861.02.07 (CORE) OPERATE AN FM RADIO SET AN/PRC-119 
 
22. TASK: 0861.02.08 (CORE PLUS) INSTALL AN/VRC-88 RADIO SET 
 
23. TASK: 0861.02.09 (CORE PLUS) OPERATE A AN/VRC-88 RADIO SET 
 
24. TASK: 0861.02.10 (CORE PLUS) INSTALL AN/MRC-145 RADIO SET 
 
25. TASK: 0861.02.11 (CORE PLUS) OPERATE AN AN/MRC-145 RADIO SET 
 
26. TASK: 0861.02.15 (CORE) OPERATE AN AN/PRC-104 RADIO SET 
 
27. TASK: 0861.02.16 (CORE PLUS) INSTALL AN/MRC-138 RADIO SET 
 
28. TASK: 0861.02.17 (CORE PLUS) OPERATE AN AN/MRC-138 RADIO SET 
 
29. TASK: 0861.02.18 (CORE PLUS) PREPARE/OPERATE TSEC/KY-99 COMMUNICATIONS 
SECURITY EQUIPMENT WITH AN AM RADIO SET                                                           
 
30. TASK: 0861.02.19 (CORE) ERECT OE-254 ANTENNA 
 
31. TASK: 0861.02.20 (CORE) INSTALL AND OPERATE RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP 
AN/GRA-39 AND/OR AN/PRC-119C FOR REMOTE OPERATION                                                         
 
32. TASK: 0861.02.21 (CORE PLUS) OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A FIELD PHONE 
 
33. TASK: 0861.02.22 (CORE PLUS) EMPLOY THE AN/PPN-19 TRANSPONDER SET 
(RADAR BEACON) 
 
34. TASK: 0861.02.23 (CORE) MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 
 
35. TASK: 0861.02.24 (CORE PLUS) IDENTIFY ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM) 
AND IMPLEMENT ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM)                                                
 
36. TASK: 0861.02.25 (CORE PLUS) PREPARE/SUBMIT OPERATOR'S MEACONING, 
INTRUSION, JAMMING, AND INTERFERENCE (MIJI) REPORT                                                           
 
DUTY AREA 03-OBSERVED FIRE PROCEDURES                                                  
 
37. TASK: 0861.03.01 (CORE) SELECT AN OBSERVATION POST AND PREPARE TO USE 
IT 
 
38. TASK: 0861.03.02 (CORE) PREPARE AN OBSERVATION POST FOR USE WHILE 
AN/PAQ-3 MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) EQUIPPED                                                
 
39. TASK: 0861.03.03 (CORE) PLACE THE OBSERVED FIRE (OF) FAN ON A MAP 
 
40. TASK: 0861.03.04 (CORE) DETERMINE DIRECTION TO TWO TARGETS 
 
41. TASK: 0861.03.05 (CORE) CONSTRUCT A TERRAIN SKETCH 
 
42. TASK: 0861.03.06 (CORE PLUS) PREPARE A VISIBILITY DIAGRAM 
 
43. TASK: 0861.03.07 (CORE) LOCATE A TARGET BY GRID COORDINATES 
 
44. TASK: 0861.03.08 (CORE) LOCATE A TARGET BY POLAR PLOT 
 
45. TASK: 0861.03.09 (CORE) LOCATE A TARGET BY SHIFT FROM A KNOWN POINT 
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46. TASK: 0861.03.10 (CORE) MEASURE ANGULAR DEVIATION WITH YOUR HAND 
 
47. TASK: 0861.03.11 (CORE) CONDUCT AN ADJUST FIRE MISSION 
 
48. TASK: 0861.03.12 (CORE) OPERATE THE AN/GVS-5 LASER RANGE FINDER 
 
49. TASK: 0861.03.13 (CORE) REQUEST AND ADJUST FIRE WITH THE AN/GVS-5 
LASER RANGE FINDER 
 
50. TASK: 0861.03.14 (CORE) PERFORM PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE CHECKS AND 
SERVICES ON AN/GVS-5 LASER RANGE FINDER                                                                       
 
51. TASK: 0861.03.15 (CORE) PREPARE THE AN/PAQ-3 MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER 
EQUIPMENT (MULE) FOR OPERATION                                                                            
 
52. TASK: 0861.03.16 (CORE) CONDUCT A FIRE MISSION WITH THE AN/PAQ-3 
MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE)                                                                   
 
53. TASK: 0861.03.17 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A SUPPRESSION MISSION ON A 
PLANNED TARGET 
 
54. TASK: 0861.03.18 (CORE) CONDUCT AN IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION MISSION 
 
55. TASK: 0861.03.19 (CORE) CONDUCT A FIRE FOR EFFECT (FFE) MISSION 
 
56. TASK: 0861.03.20 (CORE) CONDUCT AN ILLUMINATION MISSION 
 
57. TASK: 0861.03.21 (CORE) CONDUCT A COORDINATED ILLUMINATION MISSION 
 
58. TASK: 0861.03.22 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A FASCAM MISSION 
 
59. TASK: 0861.03.23 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A DPICM MISSION 
 
60. TASK: 0861.03.24 (CORE) CONDUCT A DANGER CLOSE FIRE MISSION 
 
61. TASK: 0861.03.26 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT TWO FIRE MISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY 
 
62. TASK: 0861.03.27 (CORE PLUS) ADJUST FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES 
 
63. TASK: 0861.03.28 (CORE) CONDUCT AN IMMEDIATE SMOKE MISSION 
 
64. TASK: 0861.03.29 (CORE) CONDUCT A QUICK SMOKE MISSION 
 
65. TASK: 0861.03.30 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A DESTRUCTION MISSION 
 
66. TASK: 0861.03.31 (CORE) CONDUCT A MISSION ON A MOVING TARGET 
 
67. TASK: 0861.03.32 (CORE) SELECT AND LOCATE REGISTRATION POINTS 
 
68. TASK: 0861.03.33 (CORE) CONDUCT A PRECISION REGISTRATION, QUICK AND 
TIME 
 
69. TASK: 0861.03.34 (CORE) CONDUCT A HIGH-BURST OR MEAN-POINT-OF-IMPACT 
(MPI) REGISTRATION 
 
70. TASK: 0861.03.35 (CORE) CONDUCT AN ABBREVIATED REGISTRATION 
 
71. TASK: 0861.03.36 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A MEAN-POINT-OF-IMPACT (MPI) 
REGISTRATION WITH AN AN/PAQ-3 MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE)                                        
 
72. TASK: 0861.03.37 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT EMERGENCY OBSERVER PROCEDURES 
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73. TASK: 0861.03.38 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A MORTAR PRECISION REGISTRATION 
 
74. TASK: 0861.03.40 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT FIRE MISSION ON IRREGULARLY 
SHAPED TARGETS 
 
75. TASK: 0861.03.41 (CORE PLUS) CONDUCT A COPPERHEAD MISSION 
 
76. TASK: 0861.03.42 (CORE PLUS) DIRECT A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) STRIKE 
 
77. TASK: 0861.03.43 (CORE) CONDUCT AN ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR 
DEFENSE (SEAD) 
 
78. TASK: 0861.03.44 (CORE) CONDUCT A NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS) 
MISSION 
 
79. TASK: 0861.03.45 (CORE) CONDUCT A NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS) 
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD) MISSION                                                         
 
80. TASK: 0861.03.46 (CORE) CONDUCT A HIGH ANGLE FIRE MISSION WITH NAVAL 
SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                           
 
81. TASK: 0861.03.47 (CORE) CONDUCT A DANGER CLOSE FIRE MISSION WITH NAVAL 
SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                           
 
82. TASK: 0861.03.48 (CORE) REFIRE A RECORDED TARGET WITH NAVAL SURFACE 
FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS) 
 
83. TASK: 0861.03.49 (CORE) CONDUCT AN ILLUMINATION MISSION WITH NAVAL 
SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                                   
 
84. TASK: 0861.03.50 (CORE) CONDUCT A FRESH TARGET SHIFT MISSION WITH 
NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                           
 
85. TASK: 0861.03.51 (CORE) CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS MISSIONS WITH NAVAL 
SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                                   
 
86. TASK: 0861.03.52 (CORE) CONDUCT A NEW TARGET SHIFT MISSION WITH NAVAL 
SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT (NSFS)                                                                           
 
87. TASK: 0861.03.53 (CORE) CONDUCT A NAVAL GUNFIRE (NGF) COORDINATED 
ILLUMINATION MISSION 
 
DUTY AREA 04 – FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION 
 
88. TASK: 0861.04.04 (CORE PLUS) PREPARE/SUBMIT A LIST OF TARGETS 
 
89. TASK: 0861.04.27 (CORE PLUS) INTEGRATE COMPANY ORGANIC INDIRECT FIRE 
WEAPONS INTO FIRE PLANS                                                                                    
 
DUTY AREA 05-COUNTERFIRE                                                               
 
90. TASK: 0861.05.01 (CORE PLUS) PERFORM CRATER ANALYSIS FOR LOW-ANGLE 
CRATERS 
 
91. TASK: 0861.05.02 (CORE PLUS) PERFORM CRATER ANALYSIS FOR LOW-ANGLE 
FUZE DELAY CRATERS 
 
92. TASK: 0861.05.03 (CORE PLUS) PERFORM CRATER ANALYSIS FOR HIGH-ANGLE 
CRATERS 
 
93. TASK: 0861.05.04 (CORE PLUS) PERFORM SHELL FRAGMENT ANALYSIS 
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94. TASK: 0861.05.05 (CORE PLUS) PREPARE/SUBMIT STANDARD SHELLING, 
MORTARING, AND BOMBING REPORT                                                                                   
                                                                                  
DUTY AREA 07-OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                           
 
95. TASK: 0861.07.01 (CORE) PREPARE THE OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT) 
FOR OPERATION 
 
96. TASK: 0861.07.02 (CORE) ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS PARAMETERS WITH THE 
OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                           
 
97. TASK: 0861.07.03 (CORE) DETERMINE OBSERVER LOCATION WITH THE OBSERVER 
DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                                    
 
98. TASK: 0861.07.04 (CORE) REPORT OBSERVER LOCATION WITH THE OBSERVER 
DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                                    
 
99. TASK: 0861.07.05 (CORE) PROCESS AN AREA FIRE MISSION WITH THE OBSERVER 
DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                                    
 
100. TASK: 0861.07.06 (CORE) PROCESS SPECIAL FIRE MISSIONS WITH THE 
OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                           
 
101. TASK: 0861.07.07 (CORE) CONDUCT A PRECISION REGISTRATION WITH THE 
OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                           
 
102. TASK: 0861.07.08 (CORE) CONDUCT A HIGH-BURST (HB) OR MEAN-POINT-OF-
IMPACT (MPI) REGISTRATION WITH THE OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                    
 
103. TASK: 0861.07.09 (CORE PLUS) REPORT ENEMY ACTIVITY BY THE USE OF THE 
ARTILLERY TARGET INTELLIGENCE (ATI) MESSAGES WITH THE OBSERVER DIGITAL 
TERMINAL (ODT)                     
 
104. TASK: 0861.07.10 (CORE PLUS) TRANSMIT A TARGET FOR INCLUSION IN A LIST 
OF TARGETS WITH THE OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                      
 
105. TASK: 0861.07.11 (CORE PLUS) REPORT THE FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS (FLOT) 
MESSAGE WITH THE OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                          
 
106. TASK: 0861.07.12 (CORE PLUS) INPUT A TARGET IN THE KNOWN POINT FILE 
WITH THE OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT)                                                                   
 
107. TASK: 0861.07.13 (CORE PLUS) VERIFY OBSERVER DIGITAL TERMINAL (ODT) 
INITIALIZATION 
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